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NOTES
EMPLOYING THE ALCOHOLIC UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) has been
described as the most sweeping civil rights legislation since
the Civil War era.2 In passing the ADA, Congress recognized
the need to provide legal redress for those individuals who
experience discrimination on the basis of a disability,3 as well
as the need to ensure "equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, independent living and economic self-sufficiency" to the
handicapped. 4 The Act focuses in large part on the elimination
of employment discrimination. 5 Although the potential costs to
employers of complying with the ADA may be substantial,
proponents of the bill argue that "bringing millions of unem-
ployed individuals into the productive, and taxpaying, work-
force" will more than offset these costs.6
Congress modeled the employment provisions of the ADA
on sections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 dealing with
employment7 and on regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) under that Act.8
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. % 12,101-213).
2. 135 CONG. REc. S10,714 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 12,101(a)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
4. Id. § 12,101(a)(8).
5. Id. § 12,111-117. The ADA also contains provisions regarding public services, id.
5 12,131-165, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, id. § 12,181-
189, and telecommunications services, 47 U.S.C.A. § 225, 611 (West Supp. 1991).
6. John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josehson, Proposed Disabilities Act and the Employer,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 1989, at 3, 6. This assumption by necessity is predicated on an
expanding work force and a growing economy. All commentators do not agree with this
vision of the future, and indeed some members of Congress expressed concern regarding
the costs the ADA may impose on private employers. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10,782
(daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("I am . . . concerned with the
enormous hidden costs of this legislation."); 136 CONG. REC. E2943 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1990) (remarks of Rep. Dannemeyer) ("Congress has not been kind to the owners and
operators of small businesses across America.").
7. Pub. L. No. 93-112 § 501, 503-504, 87 Stat. 355, 390-91, 393-94 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 791, 793-794 (1988)). Section 794 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as
defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
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Provisions of the Rehabilitation Act concerning employment apply
to the federal government, 9 federal contractors, 10 and to those
entities receiving federal grants or assistance." Under the Reha-
bilitation Act, alcoholism constitutes a protected class of disabil-
ity.12 The ADA extends many of the requirements developed under
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. S 794(a).
8. 45 C.F.R. S 84 & app. A (1990). These regulations implement S 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act, which pertains to federal grantees. The Department of Labor promulgated
regulations pursuant to S 503, pertaining to federal contractors. See 41 C.F.R. SS 60-741.4
to .6 & apps. B, C (1990). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was
responsible for drafting regulations implementing S 501, pertaining to the federal gov-
ernment in its capacity as employer. See 29 C.F.R. SS 1613.701-.709 (1991). These regula-
tions interpret the broadly -worded mandates of the Rehabilitation Act. In the absence
of explicit congressional direction, the responsible drafting agencies chose to employ
principles of equal treatment first articulated under the civil rights statutes. For a
detailed discussion of this process of drafting by analogy, see Mark F. Engebretson, Note,
Administrative Action to End Discrimination Based on Handicap: HEW's Section 504
Regulation, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59 (1979).
9. 29 U.S.C. S 791.
10. Id. S 793.
11. Id. S 794. For a comprehensive overview of state laws governing substance abusers
in the workplace, see Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, State-by-State Drug and Alcohol Testing
Survey, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1991).
12. For a thorough discussion of the history of the application of the Rehabilitation
Act to alcoholics, see Marjorie S. Bertman, Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973: Protection Against Employment Discrimination for Alcoholics and Drug
Addicts, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 507 (1978-79). The author states: "The issue of inclusion of
addicts in the definition of 'handicapped persons' received considerable attention through-
out the rulemaking process." Id. at 511. Prior to signing proposed draft regulations
explicitly including alcoholics and addicts as protected individuals, therefore, then sec-
retary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Joseph Califano sought an opinion from
Attorney General Griffin Bell to determine whether Congress intended to include addicts
and alcoholics under the terms of the legislation. Id. at 512. Based on the legislative
history of the Rehabilitation Act, the Attorney General concluded that Congress did
intend to include addicts and alcoholics in the definition of handicapped. Id. The Attorney
General's interpretation, however, was not binding on either the HEW or the courts. Id.
at 514-15. Moreover, ambiguities in the House Report's treatment of addicts raised some
question as to their status under the Act. Id. at 515.
In 1978, Congress ended the dispute by passing amendments to the Act clearly stating
that qualified alcoholics and addicts would receive protection from discrimination. Id. at
515-16. Congress limited the inclusion of addicts and alcoholics as protected classes in
the following manner:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 as such sections relate to employment,
such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser
whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from per-
forming the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason
of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to
property or the safety of others.
29 U.S.C. S 706(7)(B), amended by 29 U.S.C.A. S 706(8)(B)(v) (West Supp. 1991).
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the Rehabilitation Act to the private employer,13 including protec-
tion of alcoholics as handicapped individuals. 4
13. ADA employment provisions become effective two years after enactment. Pub. L.
No. 101-336, S 108, 104 Stat. 337, provided for an effective date 24 months after its
enactment on July 26, 1990. The first two years these provisions are effective, they
extend to business entities employing 25 or more employees for 20 or more calendar
weeks per year; thereafter the provisions extend to business entities employing 15 or
more employees, 20 or more weeks per year. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
The employment provisions of the Act do not apply to the United States or Indian tribes,
id. § 12,111(5)(0)(i), or to bona fide private membership clubs, id. S 12,111(5)(B)(ii).
14. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114. In the Analysis section of the regulations implementing
Title I of the ADA, the EEOC commented that disabled employees "includ[e] those
disabled by alcoholism or drug addiction." Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals
with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,733 (1991) [hereinafter ADA Employment Re-
gulations]. The protections Congress has afforded alcoholics under the ADA, however,
are not unlimited. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
Neither Congress nor the implementing regulations have provided a definitive list of
disabilities that will afford an individual the protections of the ADA. As defined in the
ADA, a "disability" is "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activitites of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,102(2). This
language parallels almost exactly the language of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29
U.S.C. S 706(8)(B). HHS regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act define "physical
or mental impairments" as
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1990).
The Rehabilitation Act thus provides a broad definition of "disability." The legislation
requires the courts to make a case-by-case analysis to determine if the Act applies to a
given individual. The courts should require each alcoholic plaintiff to establish one of the
three qualifying criteria, as is required of other petitioners. Courts considering claims of
discrimination by alcoholics under the Rehabilitation Act, however, very often do not
explicitly analyze whether a particular claimant has established eligibility under one of
the three criteria. Instead, they apparently rely on what amounts to a per se definition
of alcoholic-as-handicapped. See, e.g., Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 555 (1988) ("It is
beyond dispute that petitioners, as alcoholics, were handicapped individuals covered by
the Act") (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fuller v. Frank, 916
F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Alcoholism is a covered handicap under this section [of the
Rehabilitation Act]."); Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d
140, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1987) ("At the outset there can be little doubt that alcoholism is a
handicap for the purposes of the Act. The Attorney General of the United States has so
concluded .. .and the federal courts have concurred.").
The adoption of a per se definition of alcoholic-as-handicapped most likely resulted from
the legal resolution of the debate over whether alcoholics should be covered by the Act
at all, that is, from the Attorney General's specific conclusion that alcoholics were covered
by the Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 2137 (1978), and the 1978 Amendments to the Act clarifying the.
conditions under which alcoholics would not qualify for coverage under the Act and which
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Although Congress has explicitly stated that alcoholics qual-
ify for handicapped status, 15 the practical ramifications of this
classification continue to generate debate. 16 Continued uncer-
tainty over the appropriate status of the alcoholic in our society
reflects our inability to resolve the question of whether alco-
holism is the result of a moral flaw or is merely a disease. 7
by negative inference indicated that alcoholics were generally covered by the Act, see
Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (amending 29 U.S.C. S 706(7)(b)).
The limited commentary on alcoholics in the ADA and the implementing regulations
does nothing to forestall such a per se view of alcoholic-as-handicapped. Neither the ADA
nor the regulations emphasize that alcoholics, as any other claimants, must demonstrate
on an individual basis that they are eligible for coverage under the Act under one of the
three qualifying criteria. For a discussion of the application of the three criteria to
alcoholics, see infra note 103 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 12.
16. When Congress debated the ADA, several members expressed great concern
regarding the continued inclusion of alcoholics as a protected class and the possible
detrimental effects of this decision on employers. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REc. S10,777 (daily
ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (exchange between Sen. Coats and Sen. Harkin).
17. The foundation of the controversy over coverage of alcoholics as disabled is the
disagreement in our society over the nature of alcoholism: is alcoholism voluntary, that
is "willful misconduct," or involuntary, that is, a disease? If it is a voluntary condition,
should society at large be responsible for its negative effects? If it is a disease like any
other, however, should Congress deny alcoholics the benefits it extends to other indivi-
duals with handicapping conditions? The plurality and dissenting opinions in Traynor,
485 U.S. 535, illustrate nicely this ongoing debate. The petitioners in Traynor were
alcoholics who did not use their G.I. Bill educational assistance benefits within the specified
time limitations. Id. at 538. Veterans Administration (V.A.) regulations provided that an
extension of the time limit was available if a veteran was unable to use the benefits due
to "'a physical or mental disability which was not the result of [his] own willful miscon-
duct.'" Id. at 545 (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-202, Tit. II, 5 203(a)(1), 91 Stat. 1429 (codified
at 38 U.S.C. S 1662(a)(1) (1988))). The petitioners, however, were unable to take advantage
of this extension because V.A. regulations defined primary alcoholism (that which is
unrelated to an underlying psychiatric disorder) as willful misconduct. Id. at 54647. The
question was thus presented to the Court whether the V.A. had discriminated against
the petitioners in violation of the Rehabilitation Act by denying them benefits on the
basis of their handicap. In a plurality opinion, the Court found that § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act was not violated by the V.A.'s characterization of alcoholism as willful
misconduct for the purpose of determining eligibility for extended educational benefits.
Id. at 550-52.
In the view of the plurality, "[the petitioners] are not, in the words of 5 504, denied
benefits 'solely by reason of [their] handicap,' but because they engaged with some degree
of willfulness in the conduct that caused them to become disabled." Id. at 549-50. The
plurality also stressed that there is "'a substantial body of medical literature that ...
contests the proposition that alcoholism is a disease, much less that it is a disease for
which the victim bears no responsibility.'" Id. at 550 (quoting McKelvey v. Turnage, 792
F.2d 194, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Four members of the Court thus found a means to
distinguish primary alcoholics from other disabled individuals, to wit, by assigning them
fault for their disability.
In the view of Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, "[lilt is not at all evident that an
absolute correlation exists between the condition of primary alcoholism and ...willful
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This uncertainty, moreover, reflects the contradictions inher-
ent in a legal system that tolerates the social use of some
drugs' while penalizing the use of others. The use of alcohol
has long enjoyed a special status in our legal system and
individuals often are not held fully accountable for actions
taken while under the influence of alcohol. 19 The legal system
misconduct .... " Id. at 560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Blackmun further noted that "[r]ecent medical research indicates that the causes
of primary alcoholism are varied and complex, only some of which conceivably could be
attributed to a veteran's will." Id. at 563 (footnotes omitted). For example, alcoholism
might be due to genetic predisposition in the form of an inability to properly metabolize
alcohol or psychological components that do not rise to the level of psychiatric disorders.
Id. at 563-64 & nn.6, 8. Justice Blackmun was thus more willing to endorse the "disease
model" of alcoholism.
The range of behaviors that can, depending on the view of the speaker, be defined as
alcoholic behavior exacerbates the definitional problem. "[Ailcohol abuse reflects a multi-
determined continuum of drinking behaviors whose determinants are differently weighted
for different people and include culture, habits, social mores, and genes." GEORGE E.
VAILLANT, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM 17 (1983). Quantity and frequency of
alcohol consumption cannot by themselves define alcoholism, id. at 21-22, nor can a single
symptom define it, id. at 22. Alcoholics may exhibit a multitude of drinking behaviors,
including near-constant inebriation, isolated evening drinking, binge drinking with ex-
tended periods of abstinence, or what others might believe to be controlled social drinking.
See id. at 22-23. Moreover, genetically different types of alcoholism may exist, each of
which produces a different form of the condition. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 563 (Blackmun, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The lines between social drinking, occasional or temporary problems with alcohol (which
would not bring an individual under the terms of either Act), and alcoholism that is a
disabling impairment (which would bring an individual within the scope of the Acts) thus
are not and perhaps cannot be defined clearly. The American Medical Association and
American Psychiatric Association, for example, submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme
Court in Traynor indicating that a "diagnosis of alcoholism as primary or secondary may
depend as much on the nature of the facility in which the diagnosis is made as it does
on the alcoholic's true clinical history." Id. at 563 n.5.
18. For example, alcohol and tobacco.
19. In the criminal law of the early 19th century, courts began to formulate the doctrine
under which they considered evidence of intoxication to negate intent when intent was
an element of the crime charged. People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 n.5 (Cal. 1969). To
limit the operation of the doctrine and achieve a compromise between conflicting feelings
of sympathy and reprobation for the intoxicated offender, later courts drew a distinction
between so-called specific intent and general intent crimes, allowing evidence of intoxi-
cation to serve an exculpatory purpose in the former cases. Id. at 377. In fact, some
claim that the distinction between specific and general intent crimes evolved as a judicial
response to the problem of the intoxicated defendant. See id.; Jerome Hall, Intoxication
and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1048 (1944).
Many believe, however, that becoming intoxicated is itself blameworthy and that courts
should not allow a defense of intoxication. The commentary to the Proposed Official Draft
of the Model Penal Code (1962) summarizes this belief when it states:
[A]wareness of the potential consequences of excessive drinking on the
capacity of human beings to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by
now so dispersed in our culture that we believe it fair to postulate a general
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thus reflects our social ambivalence regarding the use of al-
cohol. When the use of alcohol turns into abuse, such ambiva-
lence inevitably results in the presentation of incomplete and
at times incoherent "solutions."
Under the terms of the ADA, a current abuser of illegal
drugs does not fall within the definition of a handicapped
individual. 20 An active alcoholic, however, may receive the
protections of the ADA. 21 Although an employer may take
steps to ensure an alcohol-free workplace and may hold all
employees to uniform standards for employment or job per-
formance, 22 the employer must also provide whatever accom-
modation is due and reasonable to make an alcoholic employee
qualified for the position. 23
To the extent that the behaviors constituting alcoholism may
vary from one individual to the next,24 so also might the
equivalence between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor
and the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk. Becoming so drunk
as to destroy temporarily the actor's powers of perception and of judgment
is conduct which plainly has no affirmative social value to counterbalance
the potential danger. The actor's moral culpability lies in engaging in such
conduct. Added to this are the impressive difficulties posed in litigating the
foresight of any particular actor at the time when he imbibes and the relative
rarity of cases where intoxication really does engender unawareness as
distinguished from imprudence. These considerations lead us to propose, on
balance, that the Code declare that unawareness of a risk of which the actor
would have been aware had he been sober be declared immaterial.
MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.08 cmt. 4, at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114(a) (West Supp. 1991).
21. See id. An alcoholic must, however, like any other handicapped individual, be
qualified for the position in question. Id. S 12,111(8). The reader should compare the
definitions and exceptions Congress used in the ADA with those it used in the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 regarding the use of alcohol and drugs. The Rehabilitation Act
provides:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate
to employment, [handicapped individual] does not include any individual who
is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents
such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose
employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would consti-
tute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.
29 U.S.C. S 706(7)(B) (1988), amended by 29 U.S.C.A. S 706(8)(B)(v) (West Supp. 1991). In
comparison to the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA is strangely silent on the subject of
alcohol use. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114. Although entitled "Illegal Use of Drugs and Alcohol,"
the section contains no reference to the use of alcohol as a criterion delimiting those
covered by the Act. The ADA does refer to alcohol in a section authorizing employers
to maintain an alcohol-free workplace and to establish uniform qualification standards for
employment or job performance. Id. S 12,114(c).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114(c).
23. Id. S 12,112(a), (b)(5)(A)-(B).
24. See supra note 17.
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adjustments or services required to reasonably accommodate
an alcoholic vary from case to case. What a court deems
reasonable will further vary according to the court's view of
who is ultimately responsible for the alcoholic-his employer
or himself25-and its view of the purpose of accommodation.
For example, a court with an expansive view might see accom-
modation as a means to rehabilitate the individual, thus allow-
ing the individual to perform satisfactorily;26 a court with a
more narrow focus might see accommodation as limited solely
to allowing the individual to perform satisfactorily the job in
question.27
Each of these considerations exists not just in one or the










'At# Satisfactory job performance
25. For a thoughtful discussion of the extent to which the responsibilities that normally
lie with employees are, to an increasing extent, being given to employers, see Janet M.Spencer, The Developing Notion ofEmployer Responsibilityfor the Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted
or Mentally Ill Employee. An Examination Under Federal and State Employment Statutes
and Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 659 (1979).
26. Courts considering claims by alcoholics under the Rehabilitation' Act have often
taken this approach. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
27. This Note argues that this more narrow focus is the appropriate standard under
the ADA. If the more expansive view is adopted, the numbers of alcoholic employees
seeking accommodation will be the only limit to the range of possible accommodations.
Alcoholism encompasses a range of behaviors, see supra note 17; accommodation of the
alcoholic necessarily will vary according to the symptomology and treatment needs of
the individual.
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A matrix of possible accommodation, therefore, can be constructed
that reflects the interaction of policy determinations regarding
(1) responsibility for the alcoholic and (2) the purpose of accom-
modation.2 8
Nowhere in the ADA does Congress define the parameters of
accommodating alcoholic employees, nor does Congress state the
relationship between accommodating alcoholic employees in order
to make them qualified and holding them to performance stan-
dards that also apply to nonalcoholic employees. The implement-
ing regulations do not clarify these issues. The resolution of these
issues by necessity implicates the additional question of who shall
bear the economic burden of rehabilitating the alcoholic.
The stated purposes of the ADA and the actual provisions of
the law fail to address in any meaningful way the balance that
society must strike between pursuing efforts to integrate the
alcoholic into the workforce and promoting efficiency in the
workplace as a means of ensuring the economic productivity of
the enterprise. Estimates of the number of alcoholics employed
in the United States range from six to ten percent of any
employee population.29 One survey calculated lost revenue as a
result of alcoholic workers at over fifty billion dollars annually 0
One commentator estimated that, as a result of absenteeism,
accidents, medical bills, and lack of production, each alcoholic
employee represents a minimum cost to his employer of one-
quarter of his annual salary.31 If the courts, in interpreting the
ADA and its implementing regulations, extend a duty of nondis-
crimination to the private employer comparable to the duty
28. When an employer is given responsibility for his alcoholic employees' alcoholism
and the purpose of accommodation is deemed to be rehabilitating the alcoholic (rather
than allowing the alcoholic to do a particular job in spite of his handicap), reasonable
accommodation will likely be broad in scope (for example, extended leave of absence for
treatment), and would fall within quadrant B of the graph. Where an alcoholic worker is
given personal responsibility for his disability and the purpose of accommodation is
deemed to be allowing the alcoholic to do a particular job irrespective of continued abuse
of alcohol, accommodation will be much more limited (for example, scheduling work hours
around Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings), and would fall within quadrant A of the
graph.
29. See Spencer, supra note 25, at 662.
30. NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 22 (1987).
31. Spencer, supra note 25, at 663. A recent study conducted for McDonnell Douglas
Corporation found that over a five-year period employees with alcohol or drug-related
problems were absent 113 days more than the average employee and claimed $23,000
more in medical expenses. Their dependents filed claims averaging $37,000 more than
the average family. William C. Symonds et al., Is Business Bungling its Battle with Booze?,
Bus. WK., Mar. 25, 1991, at 76, 77.
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established under the Rehabilitation Act 32 vis-a-vis the alcoholic,
these costs may rise. In addition to the economic burden the
private employer must bear in complying with the terms of the
ADA, he must now bear the risk of litigation and its associated
costs. 3 These costs could be enormous burdens to the employer.
Moreover, if the courts focus on accommodation rather than on
uniform performance standards, they likely will place an inap-
propriate burden on the private employer.
Much of the language of the ADA mirrors the language of
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.4 The
EEOC has stated that case law developed under the Rehabilita-
tion Act is relevant to construing and enforcing the ADA.35 This
Note nevertheless argues that the two pieces of legislation are
contextually and philosophically distinct. Consequently, the stan-
dards that the courts developed under the Rehabilitation Act
regarding the duty of employers toward alcoholic employees in
large part are inapplicable under the ADA. This Note first
reviews the legislative and regulatory drafting process that has
resulted in implementing agencies using nearly identical language
when different ends are sought. It then distinguishes the two
Acts as they apply to alcoholics and their employers. The Note
then argues that the courts should limit the granting of disabled
status to alcoholics under the ADA. It also proposes means by
which courts might clarify the responsibilities of both employer
and employee once an alcoholic establishes disabled status. Fi-
nally, this Note argues that courts ruling on claims under the
ADA should not impose accommodation requirements on employ-
ers of alcoholics equivalent to those the courts have imposed
under the Rehabilitation Act.
DRAFTING LEGISLATION: THE PRICE OF ANALOGY
The regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act provided most of the language for the employment provisions
32. The EEOC specifically stated in the Overview of the ADA implementing regulations
that in developing those regulations the agency was "guided by the [Rehabilitation Act]
regulations and the case law interpreting those regulations." ADA Employment Regula-
tions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630). This implies that
in general, standards developed under the Rehabilitation Act would be appropriately
extended to the ADA.
33. One commentator described the ADA as the "lawyers' employment act," asserting
that the Act is "[s]o [v]ague [tihat [i]t [w]ill [s]pawn [c]ountless [l]awsuits." Lawyers'
Employment Act, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 26, 1989, at 6.
34. See supra note 14.
35. See supra note 32.
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of the ADA36 Section 504 itself contains only a broad mandate
for nondiscrimination.3 7 Unlike other sections of the Rehabilitation
Act, section 504 provides no implementing details. The respon-
sibility for giving substance to the legislation, therefore, fell to
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the
predecessor to the HHS, when Congress gave that agency re-
sponsibility for drafting the implementing regulations. In drafting
those regulations, HEW relied on its experience in enforcing
statutes barring race and sex discrimination. 9 HEW also copied
standards used in the employment regulations issued by the
Department of Labor under section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act.40
Congress continued this process of "drafting by analogy" 41 with
the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act regulations primarily speak to
the needs of the physically handicapped, as do the ADA regula-
tions. 42 Despite extensive congressional debate over the alcohol-
ic's status, 43 the ADA gives only the most limited guidance
36. Compare 45 C.F.R. SS 84.11-.15 (1990) with Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 12,111-117 (West Supp. 1991).
37. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as
defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. S 794 (1988).
38. In S 503, for example, which forbids discrimination against the handicapped by
government contractors, Congress included a detailed explanation of the implementing
regulations it desired. Congress assigned the responsibility for drafting the regulations
to the Executive branch and mandated that the regulations be prepared within 90 days
of enactment. 29 U.S.C. S 793(a). Congress specified that the regulations were to establish
a complaint procedure within the Department of Labor and to authorize waiver of the
nondiscrimination requirements of S 503 if in the "national interest." Id. S 793(c).
39. Engebretson, supra note 8, at 75.
40. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, 359, 365 (1990).
41. Engebretson, supra note 8, at 59.
42. The official analyses of both sets of regulations provide detailed examples of the
"reasonable accommodations" that would be appropriate to certain handicaps. All of the
examples given pertain to the physically disabled. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, 365-66;
ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,747-48 (1991) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. S 1630.9 app.). Although commentators have devoted much attention to the
accommodation requirement vis-A-vis the alcoholic, and alcoholics often base litigation on
an employer's failure to accommodate, the very idea of "accommodation" may not be well
suited to the alcoholic employee. Michael W. Forcier, Employment Discrimination Against
Alcoholics and Drug Addicts: The Federal Response, 11 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 39, 45
(1982).
43. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 810,782-85 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (containing debate of
Sen. Armstrong, Sen. Harkin, and Sen. Humphrey).
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regarding the treatment alcoholics should receive under the Act.44
The ADA regulations also fail to provide such guidance. 5 Any
further clarification of the Act regarding the status of alcoholics,
the duty of accommodation, and the limits of undue hardship,
therefore, must come from the courts.
The texts of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the regu-
lations promulgated under those Acts, do not completely define
an employer's duty to any handicapped employee.46 The regula-
tions instead encourage individualized application of the Acts'
protections to each handicapped person. 47 The goal of affording
each individual the maximum protections possible is laudable.
Furthermore, only a flexible approach such as that contained in
the open-ended language of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
is likely to result in achieving this goal. In the case of the
alcoholic employee, however, the result of striving toward the
goal of maximizing individual protection while attempting to
apply standards developed primarily for the physically handi-
capped has been confusion in the courts. 8
Given the broad scope of the ADA, 49 it is imperative that the
courts clearly define the responsibilities of both employers and
alcoholic employees. The employer, who will likely bear the
burden of proving that his actions are nondiscriminatory 50 and
44. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,114(c) (West Supp. 1991).
45. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,738-39 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.16(b)(1), (2), (4)).
46. Kathryn W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act: Does
Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 TEX. L. REv.
781, 796 (1989).
47. See infra note 77.
48. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 170.
49. The employment provisions of the ADA will extend to the (very) small employer.
See s pra note 13 (discussing the relatively small number of employees necessary to
bring an employer under the authority of the ADA).
50. This assumption is based on the procedures established under the Rehabilitation
Act. Under S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that he is a handicapped person under the Act and that an
employer denied him employment or advancement under circumstances that support the
inference that the employer's decision was based on his handicap. The burden then shifts
to the employer to show that its actions were nondiscriminatory or that the handicap is
relevant to the position in question. The employee then bears the burden of showing by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is qualified despite the handicap, and that if
accommodated he is at least as qualified as others who were accepted or promoted. Doe
v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of
Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
As applied to the alcoholic employee whose alcoholism does affect performance but
who would otherwise be qualified for the position, these burdens will often result in a
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who in any event must bear the risk of litigation under the ADA,
is particularly entitled to such clarification.
If the courts are to achieve consistency in their application of
the law, they must recognize the distinctions between the re-
quirements of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA and appro-
priately limit the employer's duty to accommodate the alcoholic.
Other issues the courts should address include the alcoholic
employee's role in formally establishing his disabled status under
the ADA, the parameters of undue hardship, and appropriate
burdens of proof for such litigants under the Act. Clarification
of these matters would ultimately lessen the burden on the courts
and would provide certainty to both employer and employee
regarding their rights and duties under the ADA.
DISTINGUISHING THE STATUS OF THE EMPLOYER UNDER
THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE ADA
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act employ definitions of
"disability" that are nearly identical. 51 To qualify for handicapped
status, both Acts require that an individual suffer an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity, have a history of
such an impairment, or be erroneously regarded as suffering such
an impairment 2 Title I of the ADA provides that "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."' A qual-
ified individual is one who "with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position."-' The concept of "reasonable accommodation," there-
finding that an employer's adverse employment decisions were based on the handicap.
For example, in Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140
(8tb Cir. 1987), the claimant possessed the educational requirements for the position and
was thus considered qualified even though alcoholism seriously impaired her performance.
The court found that "Crewe's handicap entered into the employment decision [to not
hire the applicant] and that her handicap was relevant to a valid employment criterion."
Id. at 143. The court thus defined the issue as whether the employer could reasonably
accommodate Crewe's handicap. Id. at 143 & n.6.
51. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,102(2) (West Supp. 1991) with 29 U.S.C. S 706(8)(B) (1988).
52. The Rehabilitation Act and ADA regulations provide the following definition of
major life activities: "functions, such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. S 1613.702(c)
(1990); 45 C.F.R. S 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1990); ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726,
35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(h}(2)(i)).
53. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,112(a).
54. Id. S 12,111(8). Congress did not define reasonable accommodation but did suggest
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fore, largely defines the parameters of discrimination under the
ADA. The concept of "undue hardship," in turn, limits reasonable
accommodation. If accommodation of the handicapped individual
represents an undue hardship to the employer, the employer is
not liable under the ADA. 55
The Department of Labor originally developed the concepts of
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship to implement the
Rehabilitation Act.5 6 HEW also adopted these concepts when it
promulgated regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act.57
Congress adopted these concepts and used the HEW language
virtually without change in the ADA.- This similarity in terms
initially leads one to assume that in passing the ADA Congress
merely extended the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act to
a new employer group. Distinctions exist between the two Acts,
however, demonstrating that Congress did not intend to place
identical burdens on federal and private employers.
In passing the Rehabilitation Act, Congress intended to make
the federal government a model employer. 59 The Rehabilitation
guidelines, including:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appro-
priate adjustment or modification of examinations, training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Id. § 12,111(9).
55. Id. § 12,112(b)(5)(A). The ADA defines "undue hardship" as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of [certain] factors." Id.
12,111(10)(A). Those factors include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed
at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise
of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of
the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees;
the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the work force of such entity; the
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility
or facilities in question to the covered entity.
Id- 5 12,111(10)(B).
56. The Department of Labor used the concepts in regulations implementing 5 503 of
the Rehabilitation Act. See 41 C.F.R. S 60-741.6(d) (1991).
57. 45 C.F.R. 5 84.12(a) (1990). HEW was implementing S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
See id § 84.1.
58. Compare id. S 84.12 with 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,112(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
59. Tate, supra note 46, at 785. To this end, the Rehabilitation Act imposes a duty of
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Act makes a distinction between the federal government as
employer and the federal grantee as employer; it imposes a duty
of affirmative action on the former that it does not impose on
the latter ° This distinction implies that the federal employer
owes a heightened duty to the handicapped employee.
The courts, however, generally have failed to recognize that
the Rehabilitation Act imposes a duty of affirmative action on
the federal government that it does not impose on the private
employer. 61 In interpreting the ADA, the courts must recognize
this distinction. They should also recognize that the two Acts do
not necessarily impose equal accommodation duties on federal
and private employers. 2 As a result, the courts should employ
different analyses of undue hardship under the two Acts.
Significantly, the Rehabilitation Act is not the only piece of
federal legislation that governs the responsibilities of the federal
government as the employer of an alcoholic. The Comprehensive
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Re-
habilitation Act of 197063 (the Hughes Act) and other legislation
mandates that the federal government provide referral, counsel-
ing, and treatment to alcoholic employees.P The Hughes Act
affirmative action on both the federal government as employer and federal contractors.
29 U.S.C. SS 791(b), 793(a) (West Supp. 1991). A recent analysis of the federal government's
conduct during 10 years under the Rehabilitation Act, however, shows that the govern-
ment has been lax in enforcing the Act and that it has not aggressively pursued such
"affirmative action." Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After Ten
Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 848-78.
60. Compare 29 U.S.C. S 791(b) (stating that "[e]ach department, agency, and instru-
mentality. . . in the executive branch shall. . . submit. . . an affirmative action program
plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with handicaps") and S
793(a) (stating that "the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative
action to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with handicaps") with
S 794(a) (containing a general rule of nondiscrimination but no requirement of affirmative
action).
61. Tate, supra note 46, at 789 & n.33. But see Crewe v. United States Office of
Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the Rehabil-
itation Act was intended to make the federal government a model employer and thus
imposed a duty of affirmative action on the federal employer).
62. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
63. Pub. L. No. 91-616, 84 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. SS 4541-4594
(1988)).
64. See 42 U.S.C. S 4542. According to the House Report adopted by both Houses to
accompany the Hughes Act:
The legislation gives a clear mandate to the Civil Service Commission to
develop policies and services for the prevention and treatment of alcohol
abuse and alcoholism among Federal civilian employees which are consistent
with the purposes and intent of the act. The alcoholic employee, like any
other employee suffering from a disease, will now be provided with an
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provides a context for applying the provisions of the Rehabili-
tation Act governing the federal employer that differs from the
context for other employers. The Rehabilitation and Hughes Acts
together impose a heightened level of responsibility for the
alcoholic employee. Congress imposed that responsibility on the
federal government under the Rehabilitation Act but did not
extend it to the private sector under the ADA. 6
The Rehabilitation Act, moreover, imposes a duty not to dis-
criminate on the private employer only if the employer receives
federal funds or assistance. 66 At least one commentator has ar-
gued that the quid pro quo Congress envisioned was that, in
exchange for federal funds, grantees would provide benefits to
the handicapped. 7 The ADA contemplates no such exchange of
benefits. Arguably, this distinction implies that Congress envi-
sioned a heightened duty for federal grantees that it did not
envision for private employers.
In drafting the ADA, Congress adopted a general rule of
nondiscrimination but did not take the additional step of imposing
a duty of affirmative action on the private employer. 68 The terms
opportunity for treatment instead of being summarily discharged.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1663, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5719,
5727.
65. Even in the context of federal employment, however, Congress never intended to
protect all current alcohol abusers. Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 555 (1990). The Hughes Act provides that "[n]o person may be
denied or deprived of Federal Civilian employment . . . solely on the grounds of prior
alcohol abuse or prior alcoholism," 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-l(b(1), but makes unequivocal
exceptions for employees whose work involves national security, id. 5 290dd-1(b)(2)
(specifying exceptions for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, and the National Security Agency, as well as any other agency involved in the
national security), and for employees whose performance falls below acceptable levels,
id. § 290dd-l(c) (providing "[tihis section shall not be construed to prohibit the dismissal
from employment of a Federal civilian employee who cannot properly function in his
employment").
The courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of the Hughes Act. See,
e.g., Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 131 (D.D.C. 1984) ("the legislative history [of
the Hughes Act] indicates that dismissal was intended to apply only to employees who
refused treatment [for alcoholism] altogether or who had repeatedly failed in treatment"),
afj'd without opinion, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In Butler, 900 F.2d at 874 n.1, the
circuit court pointed out that the legislative history, on which the district court relied in
Whitlock, was in fact the history of an earlier version of the bill that the Senate offered,
and that the bill promulgated into law "expressly deleted any reference to an alcoholic
employee's failure to accept appropriate treatment" Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the District of Columbia federal courts had "misapprehended the law and incorrectly read
a firm choice provision into the Hughes Act for alcoholic employees." Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
67. Tucker, supra note 59, at 891.
68. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,112(a) (West Supp. 1991).
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of the ADA, therefore, are most analogous to section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which applies to federal grantees. Neither the
ADA nor section 504 imposes a duty of affirmative action and
neither assumes that every employer will be or even should be
a model employer. Neither the ADA nor section 504 requires
that private employers institute and maintain occupational re-
habilitation or referral programs.69 Section 504 and the ADA are
not perfect parallels, however, because as indicated above, the
ADA envisions no exchange of benefits between the private
employer and the federal government."0
Although Congress did not intend that each employer would
become a "model" employer, it did expect that all employers
would reasonably and fairly assess the abilities of the disabled
employee and applicant, and provide equal opportunity to those
individuals who were qualified to perform the essential functions
of the job. Congress did not say that an employer must hire the
disabled or that an employer could not select a more qualified
individual before a disabled individual.7' Nothing in the legislative
history indicates that in passing the ADA, Congress contemplated
a basic change in the merit-based system that has been the norm
of the American experience. Indeed, one senator stated, "We do
not seek a change in the American political and economic contract,
only an extension to bring more Americans under the protections
of rights that should be afforded to all.'" 2
Before a court seeks to extrapolate from case law developed
under the Rehabilitation Act in ruling on questions presented
under the ADA, it should first distinguish carefully the under-
pinnings of the two Acts. Such a comparison will make it clear
that Congress did not mandate, and indeed did not intend, that
each employer should be a "model" employer. In any event, the
69. At least one commentator has argued that an employer who does maintain such
programs may be more able to demonstrate compliance with his statutory obligations
toward an alcoholic employee whom he is seeking to discharge. See Spencer, supra note
25, at 677, cited in Forcier, supra note 42, at 45 & n.14.
70. ADA provisions governing employment apply to private employers regardless of
whether they receive federal funding or contracts.
71. The EEOC was careful to point out in the ADA regulations that the ADA "is not
intended to limit the ability of covered entities to choose and maintain a qualified
workforce." ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,746 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.4 app.).
72. 135 CONG. REC. S10,711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Harkin); see also
136 CONG. REC. E1915 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Hoyer) ("A basic principle
underlying this title is that employment decisions must be made on the basis of
merit .... ").
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current state of the economy may require careful assessment of
private employers' duties under the ADA, especially if the as-
sumptions that underlie the ADA-that is, that the labor market
and the economy are expanding-are not accurate.73
Under the ADA, the courts should allow reasonable accom-
modation and undue hardship to operate in the balanced and
pragmatic manner that Congress intended. 4 To accomplish this
goal in the case of alcoholic claimants, the courts must reconsider
the meaning of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.
The courts should also modify the burdens of proof and persuasion
they adopted under the Rehabilitation Act and thereby adjust
the responsibilities of employer and alcoholic employee.
"DISABLED" VS. "QUALIFIED": WHAT STATUS FOR THE
ALCOHOLIC?
To qualify for the special protections afforded by the Rehabil-
itation Act and the ADA, an individual must first demonstrate
that he: (1) suffers an impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of that individual; (2) has a
record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such
an impairment: 5 In the case of alcoholics, the life function im-
paired is generally the ability to retain and perform work.7 6 A
tension exists between the stated requirements for disabled status,
which demand case-by-case analysis, and the nearly per se defi-
nition of alcoholism as a handicap the federal government and
courts adopted under the Rehabilitation Act.77 This approach to
73. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
74. As to the alcoholic employee, Congress clearly intended that common sense should
guide both the employer in making hiring and promotion decisions and the courts in
applying the ADA. See 136 CONG. REC. H2636 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (remarks of Rep.
Chandler).
75. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,102(2)(A(C) (West Supp. 1991); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
S 706(8)(B) (1988).
76. Such an impairment presents a "bootstrapping" problem: when individuals do not
qualify for particular jobs, they suffer an impairment of a major life function-working-
and the law therefore appears to categorize those individuals as handicapped. For a
discussion of this dilemma, see Anna P. Engh, Note, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
Focusing the Definition of a Handicapped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 149, 169-
72 (1988).
77. Generally, a claimant must demonstrate a handicap on a case-by-case basis. Congress
purposefully did not provide a definitive list of handicapping conditions, preferring instead
to provide general guidance on the nature of impairment that would qualify as a handicap.
As explained by the EEOC:
The ADA and [the regulations], like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not
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alcoholism resulted implicitly from the stigma that attaches to
alcoholism. If one presumes the existence of social stigma, a
known alcoholic would always qualify for handicapped status as
one "who is regarded as having such an impairment [of a major
life function]."7 A per se definition of alcoholic-as-handicapped,
therefore, begs the question whether an alcoholic claimant must
prove that he is regarded by this employer as "having such an
impairment," or whether society's generalized prejudice is suffi-
cient to allow him to qualify for preferred status under the Act.
If alcoholic claimants need never prove actual discrimination
based on an employer's perception of an impairment, but may
instead rely on stereotypical views held by society at large,
alcoholics will always qualify for coverage under the ADA. For
example, imagine an alcoholic employee whose performance is in
fact not impaired, and whose employer does not perceive him as
suffering from a "major life impairment." If the courts accept a
per se definition of alcoholic-as-handicapped, the ADA would still
protect this individual.
Such a result is inappropriate given Congress' goal of enhancing
employment of the genuinely handicapped. Courts should there-
fore analyze the facts underlying discrimination claims in all
cases. Courts engaging in such analysis will then be able to
distinguish true discrimination from an employer's insistence that
the alcoholic adhere to a common standard.
When a claimant bases his argument not on generalized stigma
nor the prejudice of a particular employer, but rather on actual
impairment of his own ability to work, a court then must deal
with the problem of bootstrapping:79 if an individual's ability to
attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that are "disabilities." The deter-
mination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based
on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on
the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments
may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others, depending on
the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impairments that
combine to make the impairment disabling or any number of other factors.
ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,741 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630.2(j) app.); see also supra note 14 (discussing the history of the definition of
alcoholism as a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act). By requiring a case-by-case
determination, Congress intended to make the laws more flexible in accommodating the
unique needs of individuals and more likely in application to reflect congressional intent.
78. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,102(2)(C).
79. See supra note 76. Courts encounter the bootstrapping problem in cases of handicap
discrimination involving nonalcoholics as well. The Supreme Court in School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), rejected the argument of the Solicitor
General that including a condition that impaired only the ability to work in the definition
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perform a job is impaired, may he properly claim the protections
of a law designed to allow qualified individuals to obtain employ-
ment?8
Identifying the Alcoholic
Determining whether an individual suffers from alcohdlism is
often not a simple matter.81 The law, therefore, should not hold
employers responsible for the knowledge that an employee is an
alcoholic. The employee should bear the burden of informing the
employer about his alcoholism before that employee has a claim
to disabled status under the ADA.82 As with other disabilities,
of handicapped was to make "'a totally circular argument which lifts itself by its
bootstraps.'" Id. at 283 n.10 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. at 15-16). The Court reasoned that
the argument is not circular in that "Congress plainly intended the Act to cover persons
with . . .impairment[s] (whether actual, past, or perceived) that substantially limited
one's ability to work:' Id. The Court's reasoning, of course, does not make the inclusion
any less circular.
One possible means of escaping the circle is to distinguish between cases in which the
individual is somehow incapable of working or would present a danger to others on the
job and those in which the fears or prejudices of the employer prevent the individual
from working. An example of the latter situation which would constitute improper
handicap discrimination is the case in which a woman "crippled by arthritis" was denied
a job not because she could not do the work but because college trustees thought
"'normal students shouldn't see her.'" 118 CONG. REG. 36,761 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Mondale) (quoting Brian Anderson, Handicapped Tell of Discrimination in Finding Jobs
and Getting Insurance, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB.).
Courts could thus distinguish between the alcoholic who is incapable of full performance
and the alcoholic who is prevented from performing due to the prejudices of others.
Drawing such a line might also solve the problem of determining what constitutes
reasonable accommodation of the alcoholic. When an employer prevents the alcoholic from
performing, courts should impose a duty to accommodate on the employer. When the
alcoholic is incapable of performing, however, courts should deem the alcoholic unqualified
for the position.
80. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see infra notes 94-103 and accompanying
text.
81. See supra note 17.
82. At least one court has held that under disability laws, employers have a duty to
accord some form of job security only to alcoholics who are "self-referrals." See Butler v.
Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871, 877 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 555 (1990). Before an
employer has a duty to accommodate a disabled employee, the employer should have
clear knowledge of the employee's status. Only when the employer is fully apprised of
the employee's condition can the employer adequately consider the accommodation the
employee requires. Moreover, requiring alcoholics to identify themselves to their employ-
ers is consistent with the ADA regulations, which state that employers may invite
disabled individuals to identify themselves under certain circumstances. ADA Employment
Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,732, 35,750 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §
1630.14(a) & app.). The courts, however, certainly should not apply such a procedural
requirement in cases in which employers discriminate on the basis of an erroneous belief
that the employee is an alcoholic. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,102(2)(C) (stating that an individual
may qualify for protection if he "is erroneously regarded as suffering an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity").
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the alcoholic should have the burden of establishing that he is
or was impaired within the meaning of the ADA, rather than
being allowed to rely on a per se definition of alcoholic-as-
handicapped 3 Courts should require an individual seeking the
protections of the ADA to offer proof of actual disability, includ-
ing a medical determination of alcoholism and an assessment of
the level of impairment the individual suffers. Courts should
further require proof from the individual that he qualifies for
the position.84 Requiring such proof would eliminate litigation
when the individual in fact is unable to currently perform job
tasks adequatelyP5
An individual should not qualify for handicapped status on the
basis of occasional or "light" use of alcohol, or a temporary
impairment, unless the individual can demonstrate that the em-
ployer discriminated against the employee under the erroneous
belief that he suffered from a substantial impairment by virtue
of alcoholism.86 Similarly, the employee who suffers from alco-
holism but whose alcoholism does not affect job performance
should not have a claim based on handicap discrimination unless
he can show discrimination due to an erroneous belief or prejudice
on the part of the employer 7
If an employee claims that he was discriminated against be-
cause his employer erroneously believed that the employee suf-
fered from alcoholism, or because the employer erroneously
believed that the employee's alcoholism impaired his work per-
formance, the employee should have the burden of establishing
a prima facie case that (1)the employer held such a belief and
(2) the belief resulted in discrimination against the employee.
Once an alcoholic claimant establishes a prima facie case, the
burden of persuasion that the employer held no such erroneous
83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
84. The courts should require the alcoholic employee to show only that he is nominally
qualified for the position. Such a requirement is in accord with 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(8)
(West Supp. 1991), which defines a qualified individual as one who can perform the
essential functions of the position. Once a claimant establishes his qualification and ability
to perform, the employer could defend with a showing that he hired, promoted, or
otherwise favored other, more qualified individuals.
85. To qualify for disabled status under the ADA an individual must show not only an
impairment of a major life function but also that he is otherwise qualified for the position.
See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12.111(8) (West Supp. 1991).
86. See supra note 79.
87. See supra note 79.
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belief, or that the employer did not discriminate as a result of
any such belief, should shift to the employer.P
Many commentators argue that alcoholics applying for jobs are
confronted with an impossible dilemma: revealing their problems
with alcohol may invite the possibility of discriminatory action
on the part of the employer, 9 while not revealing their problems
"runs contrary to the honest behavior advocated in therapy, and
further entrenches stigmatization" of alcoholism.90 If one accepts
that the alcoholic's acknowledgement of his disease is the essen-
tial element of his cure,91 then placing responsibility with the
employee for identifying himself as an alcoholic is necessarily in
the best interest of the employee. To the extent that society
currently exerts pressure on recovered alcoholics to keep their
history a secret, that pressure serves to hide the fact that many
alcoholics do recover.92 Distorting the statistics currently availa-
ble on rehabilitation only emphasizes the fact that some indivi-
duals do not recover, which serves to entrench further the belief
that alcoholics seldom recovery3 Such a pattern can only reinforce
discrimination in the marketplace.
Qualifications for Employment
When considering claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the
courts generally glossed over the difficulties involved in deter-
mining whether a particular alcoholic claimant was handicapped
under the Act 4 Instead, courts focused only on whether the
alcoholic claimant was otherwise qualified.9 5 This approach does
88. This procedure would be consistent with the burdens of proof established under
the Rehabilitation Act. See supra note 50.
89. See, e.g., Forcier, supra note 42, at 51.
90. Id. (discussing the pressures brought on recovered alcoholics to keep their condition
a secret, and noting that suppressing information on rehabilitation only focuses attention
on those who have failed to recover).
91. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989).
92. Forcier, supra note 42, at 51.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 14.
95. See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980)
(performing no individual analysis of the claimant's status as a handicapped individual,
the court stated that "during all times relevant to this suit plaintiff was an alcoholic. ...
Individuals with current problems or histories of alcoholism . . . qualify as 'handicapped
individuals' under [the Act] unless their addiction or prior use can be shown to prevent
successful performance of their jobs.").
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not avoid definitional problems, however, in that inherent diffi-
culties exist in determining the point at which alcoholism affects
job performance. In any event, one cannot easily reconcile the
notions of providing reasonable accommodation of a condition
that impairs the ability to work and of holding an employee to
a uniform standard of performance-a point the courts have
rarely addressed. 9
Under the 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act,9 Con-
gress clarified that those who currently use drugs or alcohol and,
as a result, cannot perform the essential functions of their jobs
or who constitute a danger to others or to property are not
handicapped within the meaning of the Act. 98 This limitation falls
short of denying active alcoholics handicapped status. It does,
however, provide an elaboration of the requirement that a hand-
icapped individual be otherwise qualified for the position in
question. 9 Unfortunately, the courts and the responsible agencies
have not yet offered a definitive interpretation of "otherwise
qualified." 10
96. For a possible solution to these difficulties, see supra note 79.
97. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
98. 29 U.S.C.A. S 706(8)(C)(v) (West Supp. 1991) (formerly codified at 29 U.S.C. S 706(8(B)
(1988)). This limitation applies only to SS 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which
apply to federal contractors and federal grantees, respectively. The exclusion does not
apply under S 501, which governs the federal government as employer. Crewe v. United
States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1987).
99. The legislative history of the Amendments shows that Congress left the scope of
the Act virtually unchanged. Congress passed the Amendments in response to employers'
apprehensions, but the limitations Congress defined were "implicit in the act's limitation
and in [the requirement] limiting protection to persons who would perform the essential
functions of the job." 124 CONG. REC. 37,510 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
100. Neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA contains a detailed definition of the
term "qualified." A handicapped individual is qualified if "with or without reasonable
accommodation" he can perform the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 12,111(8)
(West Supp. 1991); cf. 45 C.F.R. S 84.3(k)(1) (1989) (stating that a qualified handicapped
person is one "who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the job in question"). The ADA regulations specify that determining whether an
individual is qualified is a two-part process: the employer must first determine if an
employee possesses the "appropriate educational background, employment experience,
skills, licenses, etc.," and then determine if the individual can perform the essential
functions of the job. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,743 (1991) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(m) app.). Some courts considering claims under the
Rehabilitation Act implicitly based their findings regarding the claimants' qualifications
solely on educational background and training. See, e.g., Crewe, 834 F.2d at 142-43 (finding
the claimant qualified on the basis of her education; based on claimant's history of failed
rehabilitation efforts, however, employer could not reasonably accommodate).
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Under the more detailed terms of the ADA, an employer may
hold alcoholic employees to the same performance standard as
other employees and require that employees not use alcohol or
be under the influence of alcohol at the workplace. 101 This stan-
dard is arguably stricter than the standard under the Rehabili-
tation Act,10 2 despite the fact that the ADA does not exclude
current alcoholics whose performance is impaired from the defi-
nition of disabled individuals. By providing that an employer may
hold an alcoholic employee to a uniform standard, Congress
emphasized the requirement that a handicapped individual be
fully and competitively qualified for the position. The implicit
requirement that an active alcoholic prove not only that he is
disabled under the law but also that he is qualified competitively
for the position presents a logical conundrum that Congress and
the courts have yet to resolve. 10 3
Setting Standards: Absenteeism and Quality Control
The ADA defines a qualified individual as one who with or
without reasonable accommodation can perform the essential
functions of the job. 04 The regulations thus define qualifications
in terms of current performance and not merely in terms of
education and training. An individual can be an active alcoholic
and still perform satisfactorily on the job.10 5 A definition of
101. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114(c)(1), (2), (4).
102. One also might argue, however, that Congress failed to limit precisely those
conditions under which alcoholics would fall within the ADA's definition of disabled.
103. The only means to resolve this apparent conflict is to accept a per se definition
of alcoholism as a handicapping condition. Such a definition, however, is contrary to
congressional intent in passing the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, both of which require
a case-by-case assessment of the individual in the particular context. See supra note 14.
Logically, alcoholics can prove themselves qualified to perform a given job in only three
circumstances: (1) active alcoholism, but no impairment of work performance; (2) status
as a recovering alcoholic, but no impairment of work performance; and (3) an erroneous
belief on the part of the employer that the individual suffers an impairment due to
alcoholism. The first and second of these options should require that a court find the
individual in question not handicapped. When no impairment of work performance nor
any physically debilitating condition related to alcoholism exists, the alcoholic is in fact
not disabled, given that the definition of disability requires an impairment of a major
life function. Nevertheless, both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA include alcoholics
in the class of protected individuals. See supra notes 12, 14.
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,111(8).
105. Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In Whitaker,
the plaintiff, a professor, contended that he was denied tenure solely because of his
alcoholism. He did not deny being an alcoholic but did deny that his alcoholism interfered
with his ability to perform the job. Id. at 106.
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"qualified" based solely on job tasks, however, is underinclusive
in that it fails to address the problem of absenteeism. 10 Can an
employee who does not perform due to absence be qualified for
a given position? If excessive absence is a valid criterion for
deeming an individual unqualified, how then is an employer to
define "excessive"? The possibilities of job restructuring and
reassignment as a means of reasonable accommodation 10 7 also
raise the question of whether an employee is qualified for a given
position. An employer may have to consider not only the em-
ployee's actual performance in a particular job but also his
potential performance in a variety of jobs. Restructuring may
become so extreme as to indicate that the employee was in fact
not qualified and that the employer could not reasonably accom-
modate him.10 8
The regulations promulgated under the ADA state that an
employer may hold an alcoholic employee to the same perform-
ance standard imposed on all other employees. 09 This provision
106. Absenteeism is very often the reason for negative employer action against the
alcoholic employee. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989). The
petitioner in Rodgers was an alcoholic whose alcoholism was characterized by binge
drinking and blackouts. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 255. Although he exhibited no overt signs
of alcoholism while on the job, in 1978 he took 404 hours of leave, and in the first 10
months of 1979, he took 387 hours of leave. Id. at 254-55. The district court found that
Rodgers had refused to enroll in a treatment program, even after his supervisor had
agreed to adjust his work schedule to accommodate such a program. Id. at 255. Rodgers
also refused reassignment to a less stressful job. Id. As a result of his continued absences,
Rodgers' employer instituted progressive discipline and ultimately discharged him. Id. at
254-56.
In another case, Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980), the
court noted that the employer had failed to show that the plaintiffs alcoholism prevented
him from successfully performing the job. Id. at 1231 n.8. The facts of the case show
that Simpson's employer suspended him without pay for a three-day absence resulting
from Simpson's alcoholism. The employer reinstated Simpson and notified him that future
unexcused absences would be cause for dismissal. Three months later, the employer
dismissed Simpson because of three additional unexcused absences resulting from Simp-
son's alcoholism. The court indicated that a showing that Simpson's absences exceeded
normal leave allowances would be sufficient to prove impaired job performance. Id.
107. The ADA lists "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, . . . and other similar accommodations" in the definition of
reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 12,111(9)(B). Courts could interpret this section
as requiring these accommodations only when they are also available to other employees.
For an argument that these methods should be deemed reasonable means of accommo-
dating the handicapped individual in all cases, see Tate, supra note 46, at 833-43.
108. The ADA seems to refer to the qualifications of an individual for one particular
job. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(8). The section of the ADA concerning reasonable accom-
modation, however, specifically refers to job restructuring and reassignment as possible
means of accommodation. See id. S 12,111(9)(B).
109. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,739 (1991) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.16(b)(4)).
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in the law does not truly clarify the role that qualifications may
play in an employer's decisionmaking nor the limits the ADA
has set on the employer's right to an efficient workforce. The
articulation of such limits by necessity encompasses not only
legal but also philosophical and political issues.110 No matter how
difficult, such an endeavor is necessary to provide a starting
point for ongoing political debate and revision of the law."'
Ideally, the courts should recognize that an employer is entitled
to the most efficient workforce he can assemble." 2 Emphasizing
merit in the workplace is not at odds with the congressional
mandate to eliminate unfair and unnecessary discrimination
against the handicapped. Certainly, emphasizing merit is fully in
accord with congressional intent regarding coverage of the alco-
holic under the ADA." 3 The ADA regulations provide that an
employer may defend against a charge of discriminatory conduct
with a showing that his actions were "job-related and consistent
with business necessity."" 4 Selecting the best qualified and most
productive worker for a given position or advancement is always
consistent with business necessity.
Significantly, the ADA already allows the employer to act to
the detriment of the employee because of the employee's on-the-
110. Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1984).
111. See id. at 999, 1014. In commenting on S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the author
stated:
The inconsistent application of section 504 to employment disputes, however,
is more properly regarded as the product of an unresolved conflict. . . about
the meaning of discrimination and the measures we, as a society, will
undertake to alleviate it.
The critical failing of section 504 is not that it reflects ambivalence about
fundamental value choices, but rather that it represents a wholesale refusal
to confront those choices. The provision's indeterminate language devolves
responsibility for policy choice on courts and administrative agencies and
leaves them to make ad hoc selections from among competing conceptions
of discrimination. These tribunals, therefore, make the actual decisions about
what constitutes discrimination against the handicapped. As a result of this
congressional default, handicapped persons and their actual or potential
employers remain without meaningful legal guidelines for interaction.
Id. at 999 (footnotes omitted).
112. Alternatively, the courts should clearly state that employers are expected to
tolerate a "zone of marginal incapacity." See id. at 1011.
113. The ADA provides that an employer may "hold an employee ...who is an
alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and
behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance
or behavior is related to the . . . alcoholism of such employee." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,114(c)(4)
(West Supp. 1991).
114. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,738 (1991) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1),(c)).
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job use of alcohol. 115 What Congress and the EEOC did not
address, however, is the more usual case of absenteeism, second-
ary illness, and poor performance as a result of off-the-job use of
alcohol. 116 These problems result in both direct costs to the
employer" 7 and negative effects on other employees."i8 The courts
could address these problems either in the context of establishing
whether an alcoholic is "otherwise qualified" for the position in
question"19 or in terms of undue hardship-that is, business ne-
cessity and the employer's right to hold an alcoholic employee to
a uniform performance standard.
Hiring the most productive employee available in order to
remain competitive or to advance in a particular market is always
consistent with business necessity in a market economy. The
concepts of productivity and quality control, therefore, are in-
herently contained in the notions of the fundamental nature of
the business, essential job functions, and business necessity. The
courts, therefore, could clarify the relationship between essential
job functions and business necessity in the following manner:
An employee who is able to perform the essential functions
of a given job is one who is nominally qualified. The require-
115. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114(c)(1)-(3). In addition to holding an alcoholic employee to the
same qualification standard as other employees, an employer:
(1) -may prohibit ... the use of alcohol at the workplace by all employees;
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol
... at the workplace; [and]
(3Y may require that employees behave in conformance with the requirements
established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et
seq.).
Id.
116. See supra notes 29-31, 104-06 and accompanying text.
117. For example, loss of worktime, insurance costs, and inefficiency. See Spencer,
supra note 25, at 662-63.
118. For example, the implicit requirement of increased hours when colleagues do not
perform their jobs and the attendant effect on employee morale. See infra note 236 and
accompanying text. Absenteeism thus also results in increased costs to the employer in
the form of overtime.
119. Such an analysis, for example, would be in accord with the analysis of the Supreme
Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). In Arline, the
Court considered whether a teacher found to suffer a physical disability from tuberculosis
was, if contagious, "otherwise qualified" so as to fall within the protections of the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court focused on whether, despite her disability, the petitioner
was qualified for the position, rather than on whether accommodation of the disability
would be an undue hardship on her employer. The Court held that such a determination
was a finding of fact, which must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 287. The factors
to be considered by courts ruling on such questions include the potential of harm to third
parties. Id. at 288. A court could thus make a factual determination of whether an
alcoholic was otherwise qualified for a position based on his work history and current
condition, including his effect on co-workers.
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ment that an employer shall not discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability does not mean that the employer
must hire or promote any handicapped individual who is only
nominally qualified. Balancing the duty of nondiscrimination
under the Act with the necessities of normal business requires
only that the employer not base hiring, promotion, or other
employment decisions on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded
fear, or upon an unwillingness to accommodate the employee's
disability. An adequate inquiry into the hardship imposed by
any proposed accommodation of the disabled individual there-
fore does not include an inquiry into the relative qualifications
of the disabled individual and any other applicant or employee.
Once an employer accommodates a disabled individual or dem-
onstrates an ability to do so, the hiring or promotion of that
individual may be exclusively merit-based, i.e., based upon the
employee's overall contribution to the workplace. An employer
may, as a result, reject any employee in order to promote the
efficiency of the workplace.
20
120. Regulations that apply to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) contain
similar concepts. See 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1990). According to the OPM regulations, one
may consider a variety of specific factors in determining whether an applicant will
promote the efficiency of the service:
(b) Specfic factors. Among the reasons which may be used in making a
determination . . . any of the following reasons may be considered a basis
for disqualification:
(1) Delinquency or misconduct in prior employment;
(2) Criminal, dishonest, infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct;
(3) Intentional false statement or deception or fraud in examination or
appointment;
(4) Refusal to furnish testimony as required by § 5.4 of this chapter;
(5) Habitual use of intoxicating beverages to excess;
(6) Abuse of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances;
(7) Reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Govern-
ment of the United States; or
(8) Any statutory disqualification which makes the individual unfit for the
service.
(c) Additional considerations. In making its determination ... OPM shall con-
sider the following additional factors to the extent that these factors are
deemed pertinent to the individual case:
(1) The kind of position for which the person is applying or in which the
person is employed, including its sensitivity;
(2) The nature and seriousness of the conduct;
(3) The circumstances surrounding the conduct;
(4) The recency of the conduct;
(5) The age of the applicant or appointee at the time of the conduct;
(6) Contributing social or environmental conditions;
(7) The absence or presence of rehabilitation or efforts toward rehabilitation.
Id 731.202(b), (c).
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The line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action
and illegal discrimination against a disabled individual may not
always be clear.121 Analysis such as that proposed above would
help ensure that adjudicators appreciate the distinction between
the two.
If the courts are to strike an appropriate balance between the
needs of the employer and the rights of the alcoholic employee,
they should consider the effects of absenteeism and poor per-
formance on other employees and, ultimately, the business entity.
Courts, therefore, should recognize that attendance on the job is
an essential job function in all cases. 1' Courts could, for example,
make explicit the implicit message of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co.,12 and
presume that any employee exceeding acceptable absentee levels
is unqualified. 24  Moreover, the courts should not require an
employer to extend a leave of absence to an alcoholic for the
purpose of treatment if the employer would not normally grant
an extended leave of absence to a nonalcoholic employee suffering
from an illness."25 If the employee can maintain performance
standards while undergoing outpatient treatment, the employer
should of course accommodate the treatment. 26
121. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979).
122. The ADA states:
For the purposes of this title, consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants
for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job.
42 U.S.C.A. S 12,1118) (West Supp. 1991).
123. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
124. See id. at 1231 n.8. The court stated, "Although we think it might have been
possible to do so, defendant has not shown that plaintiff's alcoholism prevented his
successful performance of his job. It is not clear on the record before us that plaintiffs
absences exceeded his allowable sick leave or the leave limitations for non-alcoholic
workers." Id.
125. Limiting the employer's responsibility in this manner appears to contradict the
guidance provided by the EEOC in the ADA regulations. The explanation to the regu-
lations states, "[Alccomodations could include permitting the use of accrued paid leave
or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment ...." ADA Employment
Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,744 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)
app.). Courts, however, could distinguish treatment requiring an extended absence from
those resulting in occasional absences (for example, in-patient treatment for alcoholism
lasting several months as opposed to periodic dialysis for the kidney patient).
126. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(9)(B). Ideally, the EEOC would have provided detailed
guidance to the employers of alcoholics in the ADA regulations. The agency could have
required, for example, that when treatment for alcoholism required an extended leave of
absence, an employer's termination actions be "nonprejudicial." The agency could have
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The courts should also recognize an employer's right to con-
dition continued employment on notification of anticipated ab-
sence and on proper documentation of illnesses that result in
absences. Alcoholic employees who do not comply with an em-
ployer's notification and documentation requirements should be
deemed presumptively unqualified and therefore not protected
by the ADA. The courts should not hold an employer responsible
for the alcoholic's rehabilitation in terms of confronting the al-
coholic or providing a "'firm choice' between treatment and
discipline. '',27
The prospect of treatment for alcoholism raises the issue of
when an alcoholic can legitimately claim to be recovered or to
have successfully completed a treatment program.128 If an indi-
vidual claims handicapped status as a recovered or recovering
alcoholic and has a work history indicating. inadequate perform-
ance due to alcoholism,'2 the courts should not allow that indi-
required an employer to give the employee preferential status for rehire when and if
appropriate positions became available with the employer. Such an approach would have
had the advantage of providing the employer with a reasonably reliable workforce while
giving the alcoholic employee the incentive to seek treatment, knowing that he would
have preferential status for rehire when he could demonstrate rehabilitation.
127. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989). To assume that an
employee rarely encounters employment difficulties when work performance is within
acceptable limits is logical. Most often, employers fire or discipline alcoholic employees
for misconduct or work impairment. See Spencer, supra note 25, at 691-92 & n.118.
Employers hold nonhandicapped employees accountable for these behaviors. The ADA
explicitly states that employers may hold alcoholic employees to the same performance
standard as other employees. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,114(c)(4). Placing responsibility for his own
rehabilitation on the alcoholic employee may also be the most pragmatic approach; some
evidence suggests that making the employee responsible for rehabilitation is a more
effective means of ensuring rehabilitation than making the employer responsible. See
Spencer, supra note 25, at 700 n.139.
128. The ADA provides that although individuals who are current users of illegal drugs
do not qualify for the protections of the Act, that exclusion shall not be construed to
exclude an individual who:
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and
is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been
rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer
engaging in such use; . . . except that it shall not be a violation of this Act
for a covered entity to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures,
including but not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an indi-
vidual described in paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal
use of drugs.
42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114(b). Although this section of the ADA is entitled "Illegal Use of Drugs
and Alcohol," all of its terms refer to the illegal use of drugs alone. Only by implication
does it refer to participation in alcohol treatment programs.
129. The ADA extends coverage to individuals with a history of a handicapping
condition. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,102(2)(B).
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vidual to base a discrimination claim on an employer's reasonable
preemployment inquiries regarding the employee's recovery or
the employer's efforts to obtain assurances that the employee
will be able to perform adequately. 10
If an employee claims rehabilitation but subsequently suffers
a relapse accompanied by inadequate job performance, courts
should presume that dismissal is reasonable.'3 1 Furthermore, when
an individual seeking employment has a negative work history
due to alcoholism as well as a history of repeated treatment
without sustained, long-term recovery, such facts should serve
to create a legal presumption that the individual is unqualified. 132
130. Spencer, supra note 25, at 674. Such an inquiry is "job-related and consistent with
business necessity," pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,112(c)(4)(A) of the ADA. Regulations
under the Rehabilitation Act provide that employers may properly consider "past per-
sonnel records, absenteeism, disruptive, abusive, or dangerous behavior, violations of
rules and unsatisfactory work performance" of alcoholics, as well as other applicants. 45
C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, 359, 361 (1990). Courts should adopt these standards. When an
employee has such a work history, the employee should bear the burden of demonstrating
rehabilitation and his potential for improved performance. See Crewe v. United States
Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1987).
In balancing the interests of employer and alcoholic employee, the most difficult factual
scenario a court might encounter would be the situation in which insufficient time has
elapsed since rehabilitation for an alcoholic worker to establish a record of adequate job
performance. To enable the worker to pursue a productive career but not limit the
employer's ability to hire the most qualified individual, the law ideally would allow the
employer to institute a probationary period during which the employer's financial liability
was limited. Workmens' compensation laws, for example, make the employer financially
responsible, irrespective of fault, for an employee's job-connected injuries and illnesses
that result in an inability to work. The employer thus has an interest in eliminating from
the workforce employees whose problems, such as alcoholism, could make the employees
more susceptible to accidents. Spencer, supra note 25, at 711-12.
A probationary period could serve to insulate the employer from liability attached to
workmens' compensation, the employee's requalification for disability benefits, and other
benefits. Were employers authorized to institute such a probationary period, they would
be protected from financial liability even while providing the worker with an opportunity
to establish a record of adequate job performance.
Were such a probationary period permissible under the law, an employee's successful
completion of the probationary period could trigger retroactive entitlement to benefits
the employer withheld. The nature of the industry as well as the overall size of the
business would be appropriate factors in determining the duration of the probationary
period. As with essential job functions, an employer's written commitment to a certain
probationary period, prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for a job,
could serve as rebuttable proof of the appropriate duration. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(8).
131. See Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259. The court imposed such a standard and commented,
"Only in a rare case, such as where a recovering alcoholic has had a single relapse after
a prolonged period of abstinence, can this presumption be rebutted." Id.
132. See Crewe, 834 F.2d at 140. The plaintiff had been an alcoholic for over 20 years
and had repeatedly undergone treatment for alcoholism, always without long-term success.
The government rejected her employment application on the grounds that she would not
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Impact on Others: The Safety Defense
Whether a handicapped individual is qualified for a job also
can depend on the impact his presence has on others. Under the
Rehabilitation Act, courts endorsed the "safety defense," in which
an employer or program administrator could show that a handi-
capped individual could not perform the essential functions-of a
job safely-1 3 and therefore was not qualified for the position.13 4
The courts analyzed this defense from two perspectives: (1) the
perspective of the individual employee, that is, whether the
handicapped individual could perform the essential functions of
the job without endangering himself135 and (2) the perspective of
the employee's colleagues and any others affected by the em-
ployee's conduct, that is, whether the individual could perform
the essential functions of the job without endangering others.136
Implicitly, the safety defense allows an employer to consider the
effect the handicapped individual's presence has on other em-
ployees as a qualification standard. 37 The ADA makes the safety
promote the efficiency of the service. The court, "[h]aving determined that Crewe's
handicap entered into the employment decision and that her handicap was relevant to a
valid employment criterion," held that the issue was whether the employer could reason-
ably have accommodated Crewe's handicap. Id. at 143. Even though abundant evidence
existed that Crewe's condition negatively affected her job performance, the court was
concerned with the employer's duty to accommodate. It found that "Crewe's past reha-
bilitative efforts are relevant to the facial possibility of accommodation" and that the
plaintiff had not met the burden of showing possible accommodation. Id. Although the
court's argument in Crewe centered on accommodation, such a fact pattern more appro-
priately presents the question of whether the applicant was qualified for the position.
133. Courts first recognized the safety defense under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g.,
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 403 (1979) (affirming the district
court's holding that the petitioner's hearing loss "'actually prevents her from safely
performing in both her training program and proposed profession'" and that "'otherwise
qualified, can only be read to mean otherwise able to function sufficiently in the position
sought in spite of the handicap." (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (1976))). In this case the Court appeared to equate sufficient
performance with safe performance.
Congress later incorporated the safety defense into the provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act pertaining to alcoholics and drug abusers. The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act exclude from the definition of a handicapped individual those individuals "whose
current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of
the job in question or whose employment. . . would constitute a direct threat to property
or the safety of others:' 29 U.S.C. S 706(8)(B) (1988).
The ADA provides that an employer may require that an employee "not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12,113(b). The ADA defines a direct threat as "a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,111(3).
134. See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 406-07.
135. See, e.g., Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622-23 (9th
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defense explicitly available. 138 The plain language of the statute
Cir. 1982) (holding that the city could not prohibit diabetic from working as building
repairer due to concern for his personal health and safety as a result of potential injury);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding school district's
refusal to permit students with vision in only one eye to participate in contact sports
due to risk of injury to children's eyesight). The ADA makes no reference to self-
endangerment as a valid employment criterion. See supra note 133. The ADA regulations,
however, extend the defense to situations in which the employee constitutes a danger to
himself. Cf. infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232-33 (3d Cir. 1983)
(rejecting Department of Transportation's claim that to allow hearing-impaired person to
serve as school bus driver would constitute undue safety risk to others). A situation
possibly may arise in which a court must consider whether a handicapped person's
performance in a job or program would constitute a health or safety risk to both the
handicapped individual and others. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777
(2d Cir. 1981) (upholding medical school's decision to reject student with a history of
mental illness, reasoning that the student might be a threat to her own safety and that
of others). In the case of the alcoholic employee, Congress has emphasized the threat the
handicapped employee might pose to others. See supra note 133, 139.
137. The Supreme Court considered this question at length in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), which concerned the status under the Rehabilitation
Act of an individual with contagious tuberculosis. The School Board argued that Congress
intended the Act to protect individuals with diminished physical or mental capabilities
but not those with conditions that threatened the health, and therefore the performance,
of others. In the School Board's view, if the employer chose to fire or not to hire the
employee not on the basis of the employee's handicap, but on the basis of potential impact
on others, a plaintiff could not challenge that decision under the terms of the Act. The
Court responded that "[ilt would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the
distinction between the effects of a [handicap] on others and the effects of a [handicap
on the individual] and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment." Id. at
282. Nevertheless, the Court allowed that an individual might not be "otherwise qualified"
as a result of being a threat to the safety of others. Id. at 287-88. According to the Court,
the severity of the threat and the probability of the harm must be demonstrated on a
case-by-case basis. Id. at 288. The Court based its finding on the legislative history of
S 504, stating that "Congress' desire to prohibit discrimination based on the effects a
person's handicap may have on others was evident from the inception of the Act." Id. at
282-83 n.9.
After the Arline decision, Congress implicitly repudiated the Court's justification for
its holding by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102
Stat. 28 (1988) (relevant portion codified in part at 29 U.S.C. 5 706 (1988)), which included
a provision mandating that:
[flor the purpose of sections 503 and 504, as such sections relate to employ-
ment, [the term "individual with a handicap"] does not include an individual
who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of
such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious
disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
Id. § 9, 102 Stat. at 31-32.
This provision takes the contagious individual outside the scope of the Rehabilitation
Act. It therefore eliminates the need for the employer to conduct the detailed and delicate
balancing that is required to determine whether an individual is otherwise qualified,
whether reasonable accommodation would allow the individual to become otherwise
qualified, and whether making such accommodation would be an undue hardship on the
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limits the availability of the defense to situations in which the
alcoholic's presence constitutes a threat to the physical safety of
others.139 The implementing regulations, however, extend the
defense to situations in which the handicapped individual poses
a "risk of substantial harm" to his own safety or that of others. 14
In fulfilling its congressional mandate, the EEOC has thus en-
dorsed assessing the impact of the handicapped individual's pres-
ence on other employees in determining if that individual is
qualified.141
The ADA regulations address other impacts resulting from the
disabled employee's presence on the remainder of the workforce
as a component of undue hardship, rather than in terms of
qualification standards. 42 A showing of negative impact, such as
poor workforce morale and lowered performance, can serve as a
defense to a charge of discrimination under the Act. 43 Apparently
the ability to perform one's job safely is always an essential
function, that is, a qualification standard, although the ability to
contribute to the efficient functioning of the work unit is not an
essential function but may represent an undue hardship. The
distinction between qualification standards and hardship to the
employer, however, is in reality of limited importance in that
both safety and productivity concerns serve as a defense to a
charge of discrimination, for which the employer bears the burden
of proof. The courts, therefore, should recognize that both safety
and productivity/morale issues implicate the concept of the fun-
employer. Congress thus clearly intends any consideration of the handicapped individual's
status to include consideration of the effect a person's handicap may have on others, at
least as to their health and safety.
138. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 12,113(b) (West Supp. 1991).
139. The ADA states: "The term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement
that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace." Id.
140. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,730, 35,736 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
141. Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts devised various tests to determine whether
employment criteria based on a concern for others are valid under § 504. See, e.g., Strathie
v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Department of
Transportation's contention that criteria were legitimate if they fostered the goal of
eliminating all possible risk and holding that employment criteria may prevent only
"appreciable risks"); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding
that although one must show a "significant risk of harm" to render a handicapped
individual not otherwise qualified, "any appreciable risk" would satisfy that requirement).
142. See ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,736 (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(21(v)).
143. See infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
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damental nature of employment and thus undue hardship.44
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: WHAT ARE THE EMPLOYER'S
RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE ALCOHOLIC EMPLOYEE?
The employment provisions of the ADA apply if a disabled
individual "with or without reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions of the employment position."'145 The
ADA, however, requires employers to make "reasonable accom-
modations [only] to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee."'46 At the same time it requires employers
to accommodate disabled individuals, the ADA generally prohibits
employers from making preemployment inquiries of applicants
regarding the applicants' disability status'47 and limits the accom-
modation due on the basis of the employers' awareness of the
need for accommodation. These inherent contradictions in the
ADA take on special significance in the case of "hidden handi-
caps" such as alcoholism.'48 Congress and the agencies responsible
for the rulemaking process have not defined the parameters of
reasonable accommodation in the case of an alcoholic, 49 implicitly
leaving this responsibility to the courts.
144. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
145. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(8) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). By comparison, the
Rehabilitation Act regulations provide that an individual is qualified if "with reasonable
accommodation, [he] can perform the essential functions of the job in question." 45 C.F.R.
S 84.3(k)(1) (1990).
146. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
147. Id. S 12,112(c)(2)(A).
148. For a detailed discussion of the special problems associated with hidden handicaps
such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental illness, see Jane M. Nold, Comment, Hidden
Handicaps: Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, and the Mentally Il Against Employment
Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Wisconsin Fair Employment
Act, 1983 WIs. L. REv. 725. The author states that these handicaps: "present a number
of unique problems for employers. First, they are 'hidden handicaps' which, unlike many
physical handicaps, are not readily apparent to the employer on a day-to-day basis.
Second, 'the point at which acceptable behavior becomes a disease or handicap is a matter
of great controversy.'" Id. at 725-26 (quoting Bertman, supra note 12, at 522).
149. Current administrative regulations do not define the term "reasonable accommo-
dation" as it applies to the alcoholic, and the examples of reasonable accommodation the
legislation and accompanying regulations give apply to the physically handicapped. See
supra note 42. Even members of Congress admit confusion on this issue. See, e.g., 135
CONG. REC. S10,783 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("What are
employers expected to do to accommodate alcoholics... ? This Senator has no idea, and
I doubt that other Senators do either.").
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Identifying the Needed Accommodation
The ADA regulations do not assign the ultimate responsibility
for determining exactly what accommodations an employer could
or should make for a disabled worker.150 Instead, the regulations
suggest that employer and employee take a flexible approach to
determining the needed accommodation' This pragmatic ap-
proach to planning and employment decisions unfortunately, does
nothing to clarify the burdens of proof once an individual makes
a claim of disability discrimination. Under the Rehabilitation Act,
the courts at times assigned to the employer the responsibility
for identifying the needed accommodation,152 but at other times
allowed this responsibility to fall to the handicapped employee. 153
In cases involving alcoholic claimants, the courts themselves often
determined the appropriate means of accommodation.' Most
appropriately this burden would fall on the alcoholic claimant.
Because of the hidden nature of the alcoholic's disability, the
employer may have no reason to know of the employee's claim
of handicapped status unless the employee takes responsibility
for informing the employer.115 Similarly, one cannot assume that
an employer will grasp the intricacies of the accommodation
required in a particular case, especially if the law precludes the
150. The regulations clearly indicate that the employer is responsible for evaluating
the options for accommodations in order to determine whether they would be effective
and whether they would impose an undue hardship. ADA Employment Regulations, 56
Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,737, 35,748 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.9 app.). The
employee, however, generally bears the initial responsibility for informing the employer
of the need for accommodation. Id.
151. The official explanation of the ADA regulations states that "the employer must
make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation." Id. at 35,748
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the explanation goes on to -say, "The appropriate reason-
able accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that
involves both the employer and the qualified individual with a disability." Id.
152. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989) (accepting internal
agency quidelines on accommodation of alcoholic employees as the proper standard in all
cases). For a thorough discussion of this matter, see Tate, supra note 46, at 804 & n.118.
153. See, e.g., Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140,
143 (8th Cir. 1987) (ruling "[pplaintiff bears the initial burden of proof showing that
reasonable accommodation is possible"); see also Tate, supra note 46, at 804 & n.119
(discussing individuals handicapped with conditions other than alcoholism).
154. The most extreme example of this tendency is contained in Rodgers, 869 F.2d 253,
in which the court legislated a standard of conduct for federal employers of alcoholics
under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 259. The court's action effectively eliminated
the case-by-case analysis and accommodation that Congress envisioned and imposed a
complex program of accommodation in all cases. The Ninth Circuit adopted the Rodgers
"rule" in Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1990).
155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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employer from making a preemployment inquiry regarding the
employee's handicapped status.'1 The alcoholic employee should
therefore bear the burdens of acquainting the employer with the
nature and extent of his handicap and identifying the accommo-
dation he requires. The employer, in turn, should bear the burden
of assessing whether the requested accommodation would create
an undue hardship.
This division of responsibility would have the effect of requir-
ing the party with the greatest access to pertinent evidence to
bear the burden of persuasion. The employee is in the best
position to know his or her own limits and to provide the
appropriate medical assessment. Correspondingly, the employer
is in the best position to study the job in question and analyze
its various components and their relationship to each other and
to the business as a whole.
Requiring the handicapped individual rather than the employer
to propose the necessary accommodation will tend to ensure that
the parties arrive at the most appropriate and effective means
of accommodation. The issue of assigning responsibility for iden-
tifying the needed accommodation was implicitly raised in Wynne
v. Tufts University School of Medicine.15 In Wynne, the petitioner
suffered from dyslexia; as a result of his condition he experienced
academic difficulties that ultimately led to his dismissal from the
Tufts medical school.15 Although the school had taken some steps
to accommodate Wynne's handicap, it had not provided the ac-
commodation Wynne specifically requested. 59 Wynne argued that
the accommodation he proposed would be effective, whereas the
medical school's attempts at accommodation had not been.60 In
requiring Tufts to demonstrate that it had considered Wynne's
suggested accommodation and had rejected it on the basis of
legitimate academic requirements, 6' the court implicitly endorsed
156. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,112(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
157. 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (making claim under S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
158. Id. at 20-22.
159. The medical school designed a special study program for Wynne's second year
which included tutoring for all subjects he had previously failed, utilizing note-takers in
his classes, and working with an adult learning skills tutor to improve his study techniques.
Id. at 21. What the school did not do was respond favorably to Wynne's specific request
that he be allowed to take an individualized test rather than the standard multiple-choice
tests normally employed by the school. Id. at 22. This failure to accommodate Wynne's
specific request, and to properly document the reasons for not doing so, raised a question
of fact as to whether Tufts had made a professional, academic judgment that accommo-
dation was not possible. Id. at 27-28.
160. Id. at 22.
161. Id. at 27-28.
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the view that the claimant is in the best position to propose the
needed accommodation.
In Rodgers v. Lehman,112 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit gave responsibility to the employer for identifying the
employee's alcoholism and confronting the employee on that is-
sue. 163 Such a requirement necessarily places the burden for
identifying the needed accommodation on the employer. In the
court's view, termination of employment was impermissible until
the employer had provided the employee with a "firm choice"
between treatment and discipline 64 and further had provided the
employee with "some opportunity for failure.' ' 65 The court thus
defined reasonable accommodation to include tolerating a period
of time during which the employee did not perform adequately.
The court nevertheless noted that "[petitioner] was treated so
leniently (until the time of his discharge) that he was able to
continue to deny his alcoholism."'166 The court's dicta in Rodgers
underscores the dilemma of the employer who is responsible for
identifying and accommodating the employee's alcoholism: the
law requires an employer to act while denying him access to
complete information. Under these conditions, the claimant or
court will always be able to second guess an employer's choices. 67
If the law places the burden of defining the nature of reason-
able accommodation on the employer, the question will always
arise whether the employer might have done more. The law
would thus create a neat catch-22 in which the employer's actions
were always subject to legal challenge. No safe harbor would
exist for the employer as long as a claimant or court could posit
an alternative accommodation. In drafting the ADA regulations,
the EEOC addressed this difficulty in part when it stated, "The
accommodation . . . does not have to be the 'best' accommodation
possible, so long as it is sufficient to meet the job-related needs
162. 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989) (making claim under S 501 of the Rehabilitation Act).
163. Id. at 259.
164. Id.
165. Id. The "opportunities" the court envisioned included both in-patient and out-
patient treatment, relapse while in treatment, failure to continue with treatment, failure
to participate in treatment, relapse subsequent to treatment, and job-related misconduct.
Id.
166. Id. at 260.
167. Even when accommodation immediately results in acceptable job performance, an
employer who is made responsible for devising the accommodation will suffer the incon-
venience, administrative burden, and possible costs implicit in the "start-up" time required
to assess and accommodate the alcoholic.
1992]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of the individual being accommodated."'168 An employer might,
however, propose an accommodation that turns out to be insuf-
ficient to meet the job-related needs of the individual. Under
such circumstances, the employer would continue to bear the risk
of having failed to accommodate the disabled individual. If the
claimant is explicitly responsible for proposing the needed accom-
modation, however, the employer may properly limit his efforts
to identifying any special job-related requirements bearing upon
the nature of the accommodation and determining whether the
proposed accommodation is an undue hardship.169 Identifying pos-
sible reasonable accommodations is theoretically limitless and
should not be the burden of the employer. Once an employee
requests a specific accommodation, the employer may rightfully
be charged with determining whether that accommodation pre-
sents an undue hardship.
What Accommodation of Alcoholics is Reasonable?
In the context of federal employment, the courts often have
stated that "reasonable accommodation" of the alcoholic employee
encompasses a leave of absence for treatment.170 Other require-
ments that courts have imposed on the federal employer include
identifying the employee's problems with alcohol, interviewing
the employee, informing the employee of available counseling
services, and providing a "'firm choice' between treatment and
discipline."'' Arguably, these rulings were responsive to the
requirements of the Hughes Act 72 and internal policies adopted
pursuant to the Hughes Act rather than the Rehabilitation Act.
Although the Hughes Act and the Rehabilitation Act operate in
168. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,748 (1991) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.9 app.).
169. Assigning responsibilities in such a way does not, of course, negate the possibility
of an employer voluntarily making an alternative proposal. If more than one reasonable
method exists for accommodating an individual, a court could properly find that the
employer was free to choose its preferred method. Id. at 35,748-49.
170. See, e.g., Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 253 (denying an alcoholic employee the opportunity
to undergo inpatient treatment prior to discharge violated the Department of the Navy's
responsibility under the Rehabilitation Act). But see Fisher v. Walters, No. 85C1201, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 647, at *8-9 (NJD. Ill. Jan. 25, 1988) (ruling Veterans Administration not
required to grant liberal leave of absence without pay in order to reasonably accommodate
petitioner).
171. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259; accord Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990)
(adopting the rule of Rodgers).
172. Pub. L. No. 91-616, 84 Stat. 1848 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. SS 4541-
4594 (1988)).
[Vol. 33:895
1992] ALCOHOLICS AND THE ADA 933
concert to make the federal government a model employer, 173
courts should not confuse their requirements.
In imposing these extensive requirements on federal employ-
ers, the courts articulated a standard that favored treatment and
the possibility of future rehabilitation for the alcoholic. This
balance gave no apparent consideration to any hardship on the
employer. Moreover, the duties imposed on federal employers
under the Rehabilitation Act may extend to handicapped employ-
ees who cannot demonstrate that they are qualified for their
positions. 174 A court adopting such standards under the ADA
thus would be acting completely inconsistently with congressional
intent.175 The ADA requires only that the employer create con-
ditions that will allow the alcoholic currently to perform the
essential functions of the job. 76 The courts therefore can and
must distinguish between federal employers and private employ-
ers in ruling on disability discrimination claims.
No matter who the employer may be, allowing an employee to
place responsibility for his alcoholism outside himself is not
necessarily in the best interest of that employee. 7 7 Congress
nevertheless erected a system of laws governing federal employ-
ment under which it implicitly gave the employer responsibility
for the employee's alcoholism. This system requires the federal
employer to strike a balance between obtaining appropriate treat-
173. See supra notes 59, 63-65 and accompanying text.
174. See Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 142
(8th Cir. 1987) (finding that because S 501 of the Rehabilitation Act does not use the term
"qualified," the protections of the Act extend even to individuals who are so impaired
by alcohol that they cannot perform their essential duties).
175. Both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have the purpose of providing employ-
ment opportunities to qualified handicapped individuals. Their purpose is not to make an
employee's rehabilitation from alcoholism the responsibility of the employer. The Hughes
Act imposes duties only on the federal employer. The Hughes Act, however, does
encourage private industry to develop prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation programs.
42 U.S.C. 5 290dd-l(a)(1) (1988).
176. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(8) (West Supp. 1991).
177. Labor arbitrators note a recurring pattern in which discharge precipitates reha-
bilitation on the part of alcoholic employees:
Despite the exercise of progressive discipline by the employer, the alcoholic
employee fails to respond to warnings, supervisors, and other forms of
discipline. When he finally exhausts the patience of the employer, he is
discharged.
During the crisis of discharge while waiting for an arbitration hearing, he
seems to pull himself together. He cooperates with those treating him, allows
himself to be hospitalized, and may join Alcoholics Anonymous. By the time
of the hearing his Union can point to his progress toward recovery. Author-
ities testify optimistically as to his prognosis.
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 965, 972 (1976) (Harter, Arb.).
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ment opportunities for the alcoholic employee and creating neg-
ative consequences for continued misconduct. 178 The plain language
and the legislative history of the ADA, however, show that in
the context of private employment the employee is responsible
for his own alcoholism. 179 The only balance an employer need
strike is between reasonable accommodation of an employee who
is fully capable of performing the essential functions of the
position and undue hardship on the employer. 80 This balance
places the legitimate business requirements of the employer in
the forefront. If properly applied by the courts, it should also
provide a test of the effectiveness-for both the employer and
employee-of giving the alcoholic employee responsibility for
identifying and coming to terms with his illness.
The ADA regulations emphasize what accommodation of a
disabled individual is not required: extensive individual or per-
sonalized assistance. 8' The regulations distinguish between job-
related and personal assistance in the following manner:
[I]f an adjustment or modification is job-related, e.g., specifically
assists the individual in performing the duties of a particular
job, it will be considered a type of reasonable accommodation.
178. See Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 253, 259. The court delineated factors to be balanced,
including the need for a "continuum of treatment" allowing for the realistic possibility
for failure on the one hand and, on the other, effective treatment and the needs of the
workplace. In trying to define the balance that should be struck, the court commented
that "[e]xcessive sensitivity is no more conducive to a cure than is undue rigor, and in
the final analysis 'reasonable accommodation' is the establishment of a process which
embodies a proper balance between the two." Id. This balance put slight, if any, weight
on the needs of the employer-which the court merely mentioned in passing-and focused
almost exclusively on the consequences to the employee.
179. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H2637 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)
("The use of alcohol on the job is not covered by any protections in the ADA. We made
that very clear and careful. It is not covered, so that there is no fear ...that we are
imposing on an employer . . . someone who is abusing alcohol ...that impacts on their
performance."); id. at E1916 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Hoyer) (analyzing
Department of Transportation regulations under which action may be taken against
individuals who are "currently impaired on the job from alcohol use and finding them
consistent with the ADA"). The ADA itself provides that an employer "may hold an
employee ...who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or
job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the. . . alcoholism of such employee."
42 U.S.C.A. 5 12,114(c)(4).
180. These minimum requirements are implicit in the provision that an employer may
hold a handicapped employee to a uniform performance standard. See 42 U.S.C.A.
SS 12,111(10), 12,114(c)(4).
181. See ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,747 (1991) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.9 app.).
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On the other hand, if an adjustment or modification assists the
individual throughout his or her daily activities, on and off the
job, it will be considered a personal item that the employer is
not required to provide.182
In the case of alcoholic employees, this regulation standing alone 1
arguably eliminates any duty on the part of the employer to
diagnose the employee's alcoholism, provide treatment, or direct
the employee to seek treatment.
Placing such a burden on private employers under the ADA
would be inappropriate, moreover, because even the medical
community has not agreed upon the definition of alcoholism or a
definitive means of diagnosing it. 184 From a strictly pragmatic
point of view, such a requirement may be an unrealistic one. As
one commentator noted, "While employees with physical handi-
caps may be easily accommodated with a one-time alteration in
the work environment, the employee with a 'hidden handicap'
[such as alcoholism] may require accommodations that the em-
ployer is neither aware of nor equipped to provide without a
psychiatrist's or therapist's assistance."'18 5 Successful rehabilita-
tion may in fact require an extended leave of absence from the
workplace. One cannot assume, however, that the costs and
inconvenience of granting a leave of absence, especially for a
small business concern, are reasonable. From a philosophical
standpoint, the courts should perhaps not require even the very
large private employer to assume such a burden.186
Irrespective of the employer's size, the ADA requires with
certainty only one thing: that the employer make an individual-
ized assessment of the needs of the disabled individual and
provide reasonable accommodation when such accommodation
does not constitute an undue burden and when it will enable the
182. Id.
183. That is, operating in isolation.and not in conjunction with the Hughes Act and
other directives governing personnel procedure.
184. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
185. Nold, supra note 148, at 743 (citations omitted). The ADA regulations specify that
the "employer would not be expected to accommodate disabilities of which it is unaware:'
ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,748 (1991) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.9 app.) (emphasis added).
186. Imposing such a burden on the employer reflects an attitude that the employer,
and not the employee, is responsible for the employee's behavior. For a discussion of the
evolution of this idea, see Spencer, supra note 25. Employer responsibility for the
employee may be supportable from a pragmatic if not a philosophical view. An employer
who provides rehabilitation programs to alcoholic employees may find such programs less
costly than the employment of untreated workers. Id. at 665 & n.13.
1992]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
individual to perform the essential functions of the job.187 The
employer need not provide the best accommodation possible; in
other words, the accommodation offered need not provide the
greatest possible advantage to the employee.1' Rather, the em-
ployer need provide only an accommodation that will enable the
individual to perform the essential functions of the job. 189 Given
the possible range of circumstances encompassed by the need to
accommodate an alcoholic employee, 190 the courts should not for-
mulate hard and fast rules governing accommodation of the
alcoholic. Courts should instead engage in the individualized
assessment Congress intended, 191 with the goal of enabling the
individual to perform currently the job in question.
The employer bears the burden of considering exactly what
accommodation the handicapped employee requires and of deter-
mining whether such accommodation constitutes an undue hard-
ship.192 The ADA regulations specify, however, that "[iln general,
• . .it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to
inform the employer that an accommodation is needed."' 193 The
courts reasonably may construe these requirements as imposing
on the alcoholic employee the burden of identifying the needed
accommodation. The employer would then be obligated to assess
fairly the employee's proposal and to determine if the accom-
modation constitutes an undue burden. Even under this formu-
lation, the employer remains responsible for determining what
accommodation is appropriate 194 and bears the risk of failing to
make reasonable accommodation of a disabled individual. Because
courts analyze the employer's accommodation efforts ex post
facto, the courts must establish the parameters of undue hardship
in accommodating the alcoholic employee in order to limit the
employer's risk.
UNDUE HARDSHIP: THE LIMIT ON THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO
ACCOMMODATE
The concept of undue hardship limits the extent of an employ-
er's duty to accommodate a handicapped employee. The ADA
187. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,112(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
188. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,748 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.9 app.).
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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excuses an employer from complying with the Act's terms when
a particular accommodation represents an undue hardship to the
employer.195 According to the ADA, "'undue hardship' means an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered
in light of [specific] factors."'196 These factors include the cost of
accommodation and the financial resources, size, and nature of
the business. 97 The factors indicate that an employer should
measure undue hardship primarily on the basis of expense.198 The
ADA regulations specify, however, that "the concept of undue
hardship is not limited to financial difficulty."'99 Rather, undue
hardship encompasses "any accommodation that would be unduly
costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fun-
damentally alter the nature or operation of the business." 2°0
Many of the provisions of the ADA reflect the concept of
"fundamental alteration of the business," although the ADA does
not contain this specific language.201 The list of factors an em-
ployer may consider in analyzing undue hardship, for example,
195. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,112(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991). Undue hardship is thus a defense
to a charge of discrimination under the ADA. The employer bears the burden of proof
of showing that the possible accommodation represents an undue hardship. See ADA
Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,752 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(d) app.) (providing guidance on the evidence an employer must offer to demon-
strate undue hardship).
196. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(10)(A); see supra note 55.
197. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(10)(B).
198. The employer's ability to bear the burden of a particular accommodation rather
than the actual cost of the accommodation defines the limit of the employer's duty. See
id. § 12,111(10)(B)(ii), (ii). The Rehabilitation Act regulations allow courts to allocate the
weight of nearly identical factors as they see fit, and courts may emphasize or even
ignore one or more of the factors in a given case. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, 359,
366 (1990) ("The weight given to each of these factors in making the determination as to
whether an accommodation constitutes undue hardship will vary depending on the facts
of a particular situation:'). The ADA regulations do not comment on the weight the
factors should receive.
199. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,744 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
5 1630.2(p) app.).
200. Id.
201. In defining undue hardship, the ADA regulations refer to "any accommodation
that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would funda-
mentally alter the nature or operation of the business." Id at 35,744 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 16 3 0.2 (p)) (emphasis added). The terms of the ADA provide that, in addition to
financial considerations, the following are also factors for consideration: "[T]he type of
operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative,
or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity:' 42
U.S.C.A. § 12,111(1O0Biv) (West Supp. 1991). These provisions speak to both the nature
of the business and the independence of a given office or unit, that is, whether the unit
should be considered as an entity unto itself or a part of a greater whole.
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includes not only the impact of a proposed accommodation on
expenses and resources, 2 2 but also "the impact otherwise . . .
upon the operation of the facility."20 3 Several provisions of the
ADA explicitly allow the employer to use standards or criteria
that are job-related and consistent with "business necessity" even
when their use will result in screening out individuals with
disabilities. 24
The expansive definition of undue hardship contained in the
ADA regulations comports with the undue hardship analysis the
Supreme Court employed when presented with a handicap dis-
crimination claim involving access to postsecondary education
programs.2 5 The Court defined undue hardship to include an
accommodation that results in a fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program. 2°6 According to this theory, if the only
accommodation that will render an applicant qualified results in
a change in the essential nature of the program itself, then the
law again excuses the entity from accommodating the handi-
capped individual. 27 The Court's approach necessarily emphasized
the essential components of the program as defined by the
program's administrator. One can draw an analogy, therefore,
between the "fundamental nature" of an educational program and
the "essential functions" of a job.208 Under the terms of the ADA,
"consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to
what functions of a job are essential."20 9 If the accommodation
202. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(10(B)(ii).
203. Id.
204. The ADA makes allowances for consideration of business necessity in the case of
qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria, id. at SS 12,112(b)(6),
12,113(a); medical examinations and inquiries of employees may properly be a basis for
determining if an employee is an individual with a disability, or the nature or severity
of a disability, if the examination or inquiry is job-related and consistent with business
necessity, id. at S 12,112(c)(4)(A).
205. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
206. Id. at 413.
207. For example, in Southeastern Community College, a severely hearing-impaired
individual applied for entrance to nursing school. Id. at 400-01. Although deeming the
applicant qualified to participate in the academic portions of the program, the Supreme
Court held that without the close, personal supervision of a nursing instructor, the
applicant would be unable to complete the clinical portions of the program. Id. at 409.
The Court held that the school could accommodate the applicant only by eliminating
completely the clinical portions of the program. Id. at 410. The Court ruled that such an
accommodation was a fundamental alteration of the program, and, as such, an undue
hardship. Id. at 413-14.
208. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,111(8) (West Supp. 1991) (defining a "qualified individual with
a disability" as one who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position" (emphasis added)).
209. Id.
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sought will fundamentally alter an essential job element, then
the courts should deem the accommodation an undue burden on
the employer. 210
Alcoholics making claims under the Rehabilitation Act often
have argued that their employers failed to accommodate them
by not providing a leave of absence for treatment.21' Some courts
have imposed a further duty on the federal employer to recognize
a drinking problem and to confront the employee about that
problem.212 By giving their stamp of approval to these accom-
modations, the courts in question implicitly found them not to be
undue hardships. One could, however, define all these forms of
accommodation as fundamental alterations in essential job func-
tions or the nature of private employment.2 3 Employees are
expected to be present at their jobs, and this expectation is
fundamental to every form of employment. The law generally
does not require employers to serve as psychological counselors
or diagnosticians to their employees, and experts often caution
them against doing so. 214
Even assuming that a model employer would take responsibil-
ity for what society has traditionally defined as the employee's
personal problems, Congress' purpose in passing the ADA was
not to make each employer a model employer. 2 5 Moreover Con-
gress envisioned no quid pro quo under the ADA as it did under
the Rehabilitation Act.21 6 The definition of undue hardship con-
tained in the ADA regulations is consistent with the traditional
analysis of discrimination, which promotes the view that "em-
ployment should be regarded as a means to employer-defined
ends in a competitive market rather than as an end in itself."217
210. This conclusion is supported in the legislative history of the ADA: "As outlined
in the committee report, no action on the part of an employer that is 'unduly costly,
extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the
program' is required. ... 135 CONG. REC. S10,735 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (remarks of
Sen. Harkin).
211. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
213. Because this Note treated absenteeism at length in the discussion of qualification
standards, the concept will receive relatively little attention here. See supra notes 104-
127 and accompanying text (discussing in detail absenteeism as it relates to qualification
standards). Qualification standards, reasonable accommodation, and undue hardship are,
of course, interrelated concepts, and consideration of one necessarily implicates the others.
214. See, e.g., William C." Symonds & Peter Coy, How to Confront-and Help-an
Alcoholic Employee, Bus. WK., Mar. 25, 1991, at 78 (reporting that managers should "not
even . . . mention drinking, let alone diagnose alcoholism").
215. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
217. Note, supra note 110, at 1005.
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Under this view, the demands of productivity and quality control
necessarily limit the employer's responsibility to accommodate
the handicapped individual. The ADA's concept of "essential job
functions,"218 however, arguably indicates "a zone of marginal
incapacity that an employer must either tolerate or accommo-
date."2 19 The ADA thus embodies conflicting views: on the one
hand, it appears to create a preference for employees who can
perform only the essential functions of the job; on the other, it
emphasizes the right of the employer to act consistently with
business necessity and to hold employees to uniform performance
standards. The legislative history of the ADA makes clear that
Congress intended to emphasize the employer's traditional right
to the best qualified workforce available.20
The notion of essential job functions thus does not represent
a limit on the employer's ability to hire or promote the most
productive worker but rather represents a limit on the employer's
duty to accommodate the disabled worker. 221 The courts, there-
fore, should adjust the standard for undue hardship under the
ADA and not mechanically follow case law developed under the
Rehabilitation Act. In mandating deference to the employer's
definition of essential job functions, Congress already has ac-
knowledged the need for altered standards in the realm of private
employment. Given the special problems those with hidden hand-
icaps present, courts should reconsider the definition of undue
hardship under the ADA.
Misconduct
Many of the cases litigated under the Rehabilitation Act re-
flected a pattern of egregious misconduct on the part of an
alcoholic employee or an extensive period of extremely poor
performance, followed by discharge and a claim of handicap
discrimination. 222 In some instances courts considering claims
218. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 12,111(8) (West Supp. 1991).
219. Note, supra note 110, at 1011.
220. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140
(8th Cir. 1987) (denying former federal employee reemployment because of history of
alcoholism that seriously impacted job performance; plaintiff provided no evidence of
rehabilitation and claimed that refusal to hire her was discrimination solely on the basis
of a handicap); Hicks v. Frank, No. 88C4216, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7253, at *4-6 (N.D.
Ill. June 7, 1990) (a "recovering alcoholic" appeared drunk on the job and threatened his
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under the Rehabilitation Act seemed to ignore totally the mis-
conduct. These courts apparently considered only whether the
claimant's disability: was somehow involved in his discharge in
determining if the claimant could make a prima facie case of
discrimination.m If the reasons for discharge somehow related
to the employee's alcoholism, these courts implicitly found that
the employer had a duty to tolerate misconduct or inadequate
performance for some period of time during which the employer
was to promote rehabilitation options.224 Such an analysis fails to
distinguish between discharge or other disciplinary action for
drunkenness, associated misconduct, or poor performance-all of
which indicate an individual is unqualified for the position or that
the employer is suffering an undue hardship-and discharge for
alcoholism.
Employers discharge or discipline employees for many reasons,
among them absenteeism, tardiness, loafing, early quitting, sleep-
ing on the job, assault and fighting among employees, insubor-
dination, threat or assault of a management representative,
abusive language to supervisors, dishonesty, theft, negligence,
damage to or loss of machinery or materials, incompetence or
low productivity, refusal to work overtime, abusive behavior
toward clients, and other misconduct.225 In the case of an alcoholic
employee, discharge for any of these reasons may also be related
to alcoholism. 226 At times "the employee's troubles are so inter-
twined with his job performance that it is difficult to separate
them." 227 In such a situation to claim that an employer discharged
or disciplined the employee on the basis of the handicap would
supervisor; he then claimed discharge was solely on the basis of his handicap). The
majority of discharged alcoholic employees are discharged as the result of a dramatic
incident rather than a continual pattern of subtle misbehavior. Spencer, supra note 25,
at 692 n.118.
223. See, e.g., Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that an FBI
agent was qualified to make a claim under the Rehabilitation Act despite incidents in
which he drunkenly crashed an FBI vehicle and forgot where he had left his Bureau
vehicle while drunk); Hicks, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7253 (deciding a genuine issue of
material fact existed with respect to whether plaintiff was discharged solely because of
his handicap, despite evidence that plaintiff had appeared drunk on the job, was unfit to
do his job safely, and had threatened a supervisor).
224. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that reasonable
accommodation of the alcoholic includes permitting some opportunity for failure); Hicks,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7253 (noting with disfavor the fact that plaintiffs voluntary entry
into a treatment program was not considered in his favor, even though plaintiff had
allegedly appeared drunk on the job).
225. Spencer, supra note 25, at 692 n.11S.
226. Id. at 692.
227. Id.
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be unrealistic. The employee's "inability to perform a proper
day's work or his misconduct" is the true basis for the employer's
action.2 8
The ADA explicitly provides that an employer may hold an
alcoholic employee to a uniform performance standard.m A claim-
ant may file suit only on the basis of disability discrimination
when an employer's negative employment action was based on
the claimant's handicap?10 or the need to accommodate that hand-
icap.P1 Discharge or other discipline based on misconduct, poor
performance, or excessive absences, even when related to alco-
holism, is not in response to the handicap itself or an unfounded
prejudice or stereotype. Such employment actions are a response
to inadequate job performance. Under the ADA, the courts should
not require employers to tolerate behavior on the part of alcoholic
employees that they would not tolerate in other employees. Each
business, therefore, should be governed by its internal policies.
The courts should require an employer to prove only that he
acted in conformity with prior personnel actions involving non-
alcoholic employees or in accordance with preexisting personnel
policy, and that such policies are uniformly enforced. The courts
may also properly require employers to show that their policies
do not have, the effect of denying only alcoholics meaningful
access to employment possibilities. 232
Impact on Others: Employee Morale and Unit Functioning
Employee morale and overall unit functioning are additional
factors that received no explicit attention in either the Rehabil-
itation Act or the ADA, but for which the EEOC established
guidelines in the ADA regulations.2 According to the official
explanation of the regulations, "the impact of an accommodation
228. Id.
229. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,114(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that an employer "may hold
an employee ...who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment
or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the ... alcoholism of such em-
ployee.").
230. ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,736 (1991) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.4).
231. Id. at 35,737 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. S 1630.9(b)).
232. For example, a business policy governing behavior during nonworking hours might
serve to discriminate against an alcoholic employee. Generally, "the employee's behavior
away from his job is not a legitimate concern of his employer." Spencer, supra note 25,
at 687.
233. See ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,736 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. S 1630.2(p)(2)(v)).
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on the ability of other employees to perform their duties is one
of the factors to be considered when determining whether the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on [an em-
ployer]." 4 Nevertheless, "a negative effect on morale, by itself,
is not sufficient to meet the undue hardship standard."' 5
An alcoholic's absenteeism often results in low morale in that
portion of the workforce that is implicitly required to make up
for the deficiencies of the alcoholic.26 In ruling on discrimination
claims, courts should consider the overall impact of an individual's
presence in the workforce, such as the effect on employee morale
and allocation of work assignments, as well as any deficiencies
in the alcoholic's performance. Standing alone, any one of these
factors may be insufficient for a finding of undue hardship.
Congress, however, did not require isolated consideration of each
factor. Under the ADA, Congress' deference to "business neces-
sity" justifies giving consideration to the efficient operation of
the entire work unit, not just the ability of disabled individuals
to perform their jobs when reasonably accommodated. 37
Given congressional intent and the broad scope of the ADA,
undue hardship should encompass not only adverse effects on
the health or safety of others but also on workplace morale and
overall unit functioning. In defining the parameters of the "safety
defense," courts have grappled with the question of when em-
ployment criteria based on a concern for others are valid.m The
standards these courts devised for determining the propriety of
an employer's policies should extend to effects that are not safety
related, such as employee morale and productivity. Especially
pertinent is the standard the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit adopted in Bentivegna v. United States Department of
Labor.239 The court stated that it must examine under a "rigorous
scrutiny" standard whether a job decision related to "business
necessity."4 0
234. Id. at 35,733.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring other
workers to work overtime whenever claimant was absent from work created morale
problems); Fisher v. Walters, No. 85C1201, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 647, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 25, 1988) (having to make up for claimant's repeated absences "disgruntled" other
employees).
237. See 42 U.S.C.A. S 12,113(a) (West Supp. 1991).
238. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
239. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
240. Id. at 621-22. The court was applying a Department of Labor regulation requiring
that "job qualifications 'which would tend to exclude handicapped individuals because of
their handicap . . . [be] related to the specific job [at issue] and . . . consistent with
business necessity and safe performance.'" Id. at 621 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 32.14 (1982)).
1992] 943
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
A rigorous scrutiny standard would properly balance Congres-
sionally mandated deference to business necessity with the EEOC's
specification that effects on employee morale are insufficient in
themselves to constitute an undue hardship on the employer.
Under this standard, mere speculation that an employee might
interfere with unit functioning would not support a defense of
undue hardship. 241 The standard would require a showing that
the employee's behavior was harmful to the smooth operation of
the business. 242
Behavior On- and Off-the-Job: Relations with the Public
Although an employer generally does not have a legitimate
concern with his employees' behavior away from the job,23 situa-
tions arise in which this behavior can adversely affect a busi-
nessY44 For example, "[T]he company's reputation for safety or
for the reliability of its product may be harmed by the continued
employment of a troubled individual. ' 5 An employee's behavior
while on the job, if the job involves contact with the public, can
also have such negative effects. The courts should therefore allow
the employer to mount an undue hardship defense to a claim of
discrimination when the company's relations with the public are
adversely affected by the alcoholic's presence. As in the case of
employee morale, the application of a rigorous scrutiny standard
to such defenses is appropriate. 246
Scope of Undue Hardship Analysis
The impact of an unproductive or disruptive employee is, of
course, most keenly felt within a limited area-most often the
office or unit in question. If the courts employ a broad scope in
analyzing undue hardship and focus on overall size of a business
241. Such an approach is consistent with the ADA regulations governing the threat to
health and safety posed by an employee's presence in the workforce. The regulations
state, "a speculative or remote risk is insufficient [to entitle the employer to discharge
the employee]." ADA Employment Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,745 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(r) app.).
242. Such a requirement is in line with current arbitration trends. See Spencer, supra
note 25, at 688 & n.104.
243. Id. at 687.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 687-88.
246. See supra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
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rather than the functioning of a particular office or subdivision,
the analysis may distort the true impact of an unproductive
employee. Although a broad scope for an economic analysis of
undue hardship is appropriate, the courts should adopt a flexible
approach to determining the appropriate scope for analysis of
other factors.27 The nature of the accommodation requested by
the employee, or of the hardship claimed by the employer, should
determine scope. A broad scope is appropriate, for example, in
determining whether reassignment would constitute an undue
hardship. A more limited scope may be appropriate when an
employee requests job restructuring. When an employer claims
negative effects on unit functioning or productivity, the courts
should appropriately limit their analysis to the work unit directly
affected.
CONCLUSION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, although modeled
on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its implementing regula-
tions, should be carefully differentiated from that Act. The courts
should distinguish the legal contexts in which the two Acts
operate, as well as the congressional intent behind each Act.
Courts must recognize that as a result of these considerations,
rulings on disability claims under the Rehabilitation Act involving
alcoholics do not necessarily have precedential value under the
ADA.
The need for a well considered and balanced approach to the
status of the alcoholic under the ADA is particularly pressing.
Congress did not resolve the controversy over granting the
alcoholic disabled status merely by including in the ADA sections
governing employment of alcoholics. Neither Congress nor the
EEOC has provided specific guidance on the proper balance
247. One can find authority for such an approach in the ADA, which states:
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship
[an employer may consider]
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, andfunctions of the workforce of
such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal re-
lationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C.A. 5 12,111(10)(B) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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between reasonable accommodation of alcoholic employees and
undue hardship on employers or the role that qualifications must
play in that balance. Congress, however, has made clear its
intention that courts give the legitimate business needs of an
employer the most weight in that balance. The courts now have
the duty to give substance to the congressional plan by deline-
ating the responsibilities of both employers and alcoholic employ-
ees under the ADA.
Alcoholic employees should have the responsibility of notifying
their employers of their condition in order to qualify for handi-
capped status under the ADA. Given the often hidden nature of
the alcoholic's disability and the delicate balance between alco-
holic and nonalcoholic behaviors, the courts must not interpret
the ADA as placing with the employer the responsibility for
"diagnosing" the alcoholic's problem. Placing the responsibility
on the alcoholic employee of identifying himself will assign the
burden to the party with the greatest access to information; it
could also serve to facilitate the alcoholic's recovery.
The alcoholic claimant should bear the burden of establishing
an actual or perceived impairment of a major life activity, as the
ADA requires. The courts should not continue to employ a per
se definition of alcoholic-as-handicapped. They should perform the
individualized analysis of disabled status that Congress envi-
sioned. Only in this manner can the courts begin to make the
distinction between true discrimination and the application of
nondiscriminatory employment criteria. Once an individual has
made a claim to disabled status, the individual should have the
responsibility of identifying any accommodations required in his
particular case. The claimant should also provide the medical and
other information pertinent to his request for accommodation.
Employers are properly responsible for identifying any special
job requirements bearing on the issue of accommodation and for
determining if a proposed accommodation will constitute an undue
hardship. Dividing these responsibilities in this manner places
the appropriate burdens on the party with the greatest access
to information and provides an equitable division of responsibil-
ities between employer and employee.
The courts also should recognize that employers are entitled
to make reasonable inquiries regarding an alcoholic's work history
and to obtain assurances of adequate rehabilitation in order to
determine the worker's qualifications. To this end, the courts
should attempt to clarify the circumstances under which an
alcoholic can legitimately claim to be rehabilitated. The courts
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should also address the issue of relapse and the conditions under
which an alcoholic can no longer claim to fall within the protec-
tions of the ADA.
The courts should distinguish between employment actions
based on employee misconduct, even when a disability is involved,
and employment actions based on that disability. The courts also
should recognize that an essential element of every job is that
the employee be present to do the job. An employee, therefore,
is unqualified when his alcoholism occasions excessive absences
from the job, whether these absences are due to primary alco-
holism or to secondary illness.
In analyzing undue hardship, the courts should consider the
effects of the individual's alcoholism on other employees and the
functioning of the work unit as a whole, as well as the business'
relations with the public. The courts should consider effects that
are intangible, such as employee morale and productivity, as well
as effects that are quantifiable, such as overtime pay and medical
costs, in analyzing undue hardship. When considering such fac-
tors, the courts should employ a scope of analysis appropriate to
the factor being considered.
If the courts clarify these points in a consistent manner, they
will move toward establishing clearly when alcoholics are quali-
fied for disabled status and when employers suffer an undue
hardship. In doing so, they will provide predictability for em-
ployer and employee, and ultimately lessen the burden on the
courts. Consistent rulings on all of these points, however, are
still unlikely to quiet all debate on the appropriate status for
alcoholics in our society. Nevertheless, only by adhering to the
balance Congress intended to strike between employers' and
alcoholics' interests can the courts provide a basis for the further
refinement of the law.
Wendy K. Voss
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